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INTRODUCTION

I

n 1933, Senator Burton Wheeler issued the following appeal: “For the captains of industry to be drawing down
large salaries is unconscionable and unpatriotic . . . . The practice must be curbed by legislation, through taxation and publicity.”1 In the years since his plea, Wheeler’s refrain has been
echoed countless times by academics, the press, and politicians.2 Lately, even some wealthy investors are losing their patience: Warren Buffet, the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, has
repeatedly argued for change, noting that “[t]oo often, executive
compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with performance.”3 President Obama joined the fray in 2009, calling
the bonuses Wall Street announced in January of that year

1. Thomas F. Cooley, The Pay Czar’s Dilemma, FORBES.COM (Aug. 19,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/18/andrew-hall-executivepay-citigroup-opinions-columnists-thomas-cooley.html.
2. See, e.g., id.
3. Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, to Shareholders
(Feb.
28,
2006),
available
at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2005.html.
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“shameful” and “the height of irresponsibility.”4 Yet actual reforms have been rare,5 generally adopted only to curb highly
publicized, company-specific excesses. Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (“Tax Code”), for example, was enacted
after the Enron scandal and aims to prevent executive plunder
of companies at the expense of shareholders and employees.6
The limit on the amount of annual compensation that companies are allowed to deduct as a reasonable and necessary business expense under Section 162(m) of the Tax Code was similarly targeted.7 But with the events that triggered the Great
Recession vindicating scholars’ long-standing claim that existing pay regulations fail to incentivize sound corporate governance,8 such criticism gained a foothold with voters, vaulting
systemic reform to the top of many a political agenda.9 Indeed,
the focus on executive compensation at the September 2009
G20 Summit in Pittsburgh reflected global pressure to recalibrate practices to both speed economic recovery and avoid further crises, with Germany and France advocating aggressive
global regulation and significant change.10

4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‘Shameful,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1.
5. Warren Buffet famously lamented the situation in his 2003 letter to
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders: “In judging whether Corporate America is
serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the
results aren’t encouraging.” Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway,
to
Shareholders
(Feb.
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html.
6. See Andrew Liazos, Ghost of Enron Wreaks New Havoc on Exec Pay,
(June
13,
2011),
CFO.COM
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14581582/c_14581713.
7. See Daniel Nelson, Section 162(m) Revisited, TAXPROF BLOG 1 (Jan. 14,
2005), http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com/taxprof/linkdocs/2005-686-1.pdf.
8. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
61–64 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf.
9. Nina Easton, Main Street Turns Against Wall Street, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/26/news/economy/easton_backlash.fortune/inde
x.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2008, 11:03 AM).
10. See Edmund L. Andrews, Leaders of G-20 Vow to Reshape Global
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at A1; Markus Dettmer et al., G-20 Nations Divided over How to Fix World Economy, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Sept.
22,
2009),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,6504492,00.html.
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Finding a “fix” is of course easier said than done. As they
choose which kinds of regulations to enact in order to avoid another Great Recession, government leaders around the world
must grapple with the difficult issues that lie at the heart of
executive compensation reform, implementing sound corporate
governance measures that allow boards the necessary flexibility to recruit the talented professionals needed to grow the
company and benefit its shareholders without enthroning a
management team whose cost outweighs the benefits it provides. This requires regulators to choose where to draw the line
between short-term profit maximization and long-term company stability and performance, a difficult task further complicated by seemingly irreconcilable interests. Fortune 500 companies, fearful of losing their ability to attract “the best and the
brightest,” lobby intensely against pay restrictions.11 This lobbying is in turn viewed with outraged contempt by academia,
the public, and the media, who find it deeply unfair that the
very institutions and individuals that brought the world economy to its knees continue to enjoy extraordinary benefits.12 In
response to the banking crisis following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, regulators were more or less
forced to take some action, implementing policies targeting the
financial services sector. For example, in October 2009, Kenneth Feinberg, President Obama’s Pay Czar, announced severe
pay cuts for senior management at institutions that had received—but not repaid—funds through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).13 In France, laws enacted in the fall of
2008 required banks receiving bailout money to curb executive
11. See Colin Barr, Who Cares if Wall Street ‘Talent’ Leaves?, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/23/news/newsmakers/fed.feinberg.fortune/?post
version=2009102310 (last updated Oct. 23, 2009, 10:13 AM). For reactions to
the Pay Czar’s salary cuts, see David Ellis & Ed Henry, Pay Czar Issues SalMONEY,
ary
Caps
for
Execs,
CNN
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/11/news/companies/feinberg_compensation/ind
ex.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2009); Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Really Worth?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at MM32.
12. See, e.g., Patricia O’Connell, Executive Compensation and Public OutBUSINESSWEEK.COM
(Mar.
1,
2010),
rage,
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/feb2010/ca20100224_089346
.htm.
13. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. to Order Pay Cuts at Firms That Got Most
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2009),
Aid,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/business/22pay.html.
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pay practices and shift their business strategies to prioritize
credit for homeowners and small businesses.14 However, despite a proliferation of these types of limited reforms, action
was lacking when it came to comprehensive compensation regulations; efforts to reach a consensus at the Pittsburgh G20
Summit a year later belied the trepidation of many world leaders in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis.15
One notable exception to the then-global failure to commit
was Germany, which took decisive action to try to systemically
change executive compensation structures extraordinarily
quickly. In addition to its advocacy for global reform at the
Pittsburgh G20, Germany passed the Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetz (“VorstAG”) on June 18, 2009.16 Applicable to all publicly traded German companies, the VorstAG
aimed to change the way executive compensation is discussed
and structured, increase the transparency of executive compensation, and encourage companies to focus on long-term performance in lieu of short-term gains.17 Among other things, the
VorstAG holds supervisory boards liable for compensation
choices, introduces “Say-on-Pay” measures to allow shareholders to vote on executive pay, and requires a long-term basis for
performance assessment.18 Enacting these laws was a particularly significant step in buttressing German corporate governance requirements in securities regulation and in executive
compensation, which have historically been less robust than
corporate governance measures affecting U.S. companies.19
14. See
France—Economy
and
Trade
of
France,
QFINANCE,
http://www.qfinance.com/country-profiles/france (last visited Dec. 26, 2012);
Lionel Laurent, A Modest Bailout for France’s Banks, FORBES.COM (Oct. 21,
2008,
2:45
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/21/bnp-banks-updatemarkets-equity-cx_ll_1021markets14.html.
15. See Dettmer et al., supra note 10. Even then, the final decision related
only to banker bonuses, a far cry from comprehensive regulation. See Patrick
Wintour & Andrew Clark, G20 Leaders Split over Banker Bonus Curbs,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2009, at 1.
16. For a good explanation of the law and situating the law within the
broader context of reform, see, for example, KPMG’s Audit Comm. Inst., Auf
einen Blick: Die neue Vorstandsvergütung KPMG (July 2009),
http://www.kpmg.de/Themen/15882.htm.
17. Germany Introduces New Rules on Management Board Compensation,
Briefing (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, U.K.), Aug. 2009, at 1.
18. Id. at 2, 3.
19. While Germany is often cited as lagging behind the United States in
corporate governance matters, this is untrue in a large number of areas, such
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That the reform laws were pushed through by German Chancellor Angela Merkel over strong objections from the business
community, a group that traditionally supports Merkel’s conservative party, also signals German dedication to new executive compensation structures.20
Too often, discussions about executive compensation reform
devolve into abstract discussions of hypothetical and assumed
interests, reactions, and consequences, leading to paralysis rather than action. One need only look to the missed deadlines
and extended wrangling over the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), both before and after its
passage, for confirmation.21 By analyzing and evaluating the
new German executive compensation laws contained in the
VorstAG, this Article seeks to inject a dose of reality into the
debate. The VorstAG, as detailed below, makes an excellent
candidate for this type of evaluation for several reasons. First,
all public companies discuss their compensation strategies in
their annual reports, which are freely available on their respective websites. Second, VorstAG became applicable law within a
very short time frame; it was passed by the Bundestag on June
18, 2009, and entered into force in its entirety before the end of

as takeover law. For a more complete coverage of German corporate governance measures in this and other areas, see generally STEFAN GRUNDMANN,
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2d
ed. 2012).
20. See Joachim Jahn, Gesetzespläne Experten: Manager aus Aufsichtsrat
ALLGEMEINE
(May
25,
2009),
fernhalten,
FRANKFURTER
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/recht-steuern/gesetzesplaene-expertenmanager-aus-aufsichtsrat-fernhalten-1626988.html; see also Letter from Berlin: Merkel Takes on the Fat Cats, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,522480,00.html.
21. See DealBook, Senator Dodd to Press Financial Reform Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
8,
2009,
5:14
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/senator-dodd-to-press-financialreform-ahead-aides/?scp=11&sq=dodd+frank&st=nyt; Peter Alpern, Dissent
and
Political
Wrangling
Leaves Financial
Overhaul
Tottering,
BUSINESSFINANCE
(June
20,
2011),
http://businessfinancemag.com/article/dissent-and-political-wrangling-leavesfinancial-overhaul-tottering-0620. The post-bill passage wrangling was satirically documented on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, in which John Oliver
portrayed a tattered version of the bill. The Daily Show: Dodd Frank Update,
(Comedy Central television broadcast July 28, 2011), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-july-28-2011/dodd-frank-update.
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the summer—the majority of it the next day.22 The timing
makes it relatively simple to pinpoint the moment when companies were required to incorporate VorstAG-related changes
into their compensation policy. Third, the laws were cohesive
and extensive enough to outline a clear compensation philosophy, resulting in clear strategies that public companies needed
to adopt. It is therefore relatively simple to identify certain
types of changes in annual reports or other ad hoc press releases that can be traced back to the VorstAG. Finally, the rule was
not adopted in connection with broader corporate governance or
executive compensation reform, on either the German or the
European level. The law stands alone, and as such, it is relatively safe to surmise that the VorstAG was the catalyst for
changes to executive compensation policy by public companies
that were implemented in its immediate aftermath. In short,
the VorstAG is a targeted, measurable law, and a thoughtful
examination of whether and how it prompted changes in executive compensation structure and disclosure can provide facts
about what has worked and what has been a challenge, and
can thereby help address the speculative “what ifs” of the debate on executive compensation reform. Did the VorstAG endanger German management practices and even German companies as the critics feared?23 Did the law inaugurate a new era
of corporate governance as the proponents hoped?24 And on a
more basic level, did anything in fact change?
An examination of the publicly available documents from the
Deutscher Aktien IndeX, or the DAX 30, answers the final
question with a resounding “yes.”25 The compensation disclosure of DAX 30 companies today looks far different than it did
even three years ago. By requiring companies to shift their
compensation strategies to focus on “sustainability,” the gov22. See Benedikt Hohaus & Christoph Weber, Inkrafttreten des Gesetzes
zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und Änderungen des deutschen
Corporate Governance Kodex, P + P Pöllath & Partners (June 23, 2009),
http://www.pplaw.de/_downloads/publications/Mdt-Info/090623-CIVorstandsverguetung.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Manager protestieren bei Merkel, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
(May 22, 2009), http://www.faz.net/-gqi-12khh.
24. VorstAG, Bundestag verschärft Regelungen zur Vorstandsgütung,
PERSPEKTIVEMITTELSTAND, (June 19, 2009), http://www.perspektivemittelstand.de/VorstAG-Bundestag-verschaerft-Regelungen-zurVorstandsguetung/management-wissen/2714.html.
25. For details on the changes, see infra Parts III and IV.
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ernment explicitly extends Germany’s sustainability-based approach to corporate governance into the compensation realm.
German companies have historically been run on the stakeholder basis: the company has responsibility not only to shareholders, as in the American model, but also to employees, creditors, suppliers, and anyone else who might have a stake in the
company.26 Maximizing profits at the expense of one group is
anathema, and the VorstAG makes clear that compensation
packages are not exempt from this consideration.
This Article, then, analyzes and evaluates the new German
executive compensation standards set forth the VorstAG on
their own terms and seeks to find applicable lessons from their
implementation in Germany that could help shape additional
U.S. compensation reform or even provide a basis for international regulation. Part I examines the American side of the
equation, including the much-decried compensation culture,
the discussion surrounding it, and attempts to reform it, up to
and including the latest Dodd-Frank developments. Part II
crosses the Atlantic to explore corporate governance culture in
Germany and how it has grown, including the development and
implementation of the VorstAG. Part III addresses the concrete
ways in which compensation structure and disclosure within
the DAX 30 have changed since the implementation of the
VorstAG, based on a careful examination of the compensation
disclosures of these companies, largely in their annual reports,
from 2008 to 2010. Part IV takes a hard look at the actual effects of the VorstAG based on the material discussed in Part
III, discusses how executive compensation practices and culture in Germany were expected to change as a result of the new
law, and evaluates the degree to which any changes lived up to
expectations, whether of the lawmakers or of the critics. Part V
presents lessons that can be drawn from the VorstAG in Germany that might help reinvigorate the largely stalled U.S. discussion about how to solve the executive compensation problem. The possibilities for harmonizing executive compensation
regulation at the international level also receive consideration
in Part V, before turning to a brief conclusion.

26. See infra text accompanying note 101.
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I. U.S. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Compensation Reform
It is not surprising that executive compensation is particularly contentious in the United States. As the “land of opportunity,” the United States provided fertile ground for successful
businessmen to earn vast amounts of money; critics followed
shortly on their heels. The sums earned and spent by the socalled robber barons at the turn of the twentieth century were
detailed—and heavily criticized—in the press in hopes of giving
rise to reform.27 Indeed, the detailed coverage of one particularly lavish party thrown in 1905 by James Hyde, the majority
shareholder of Equitable Insurance, that cost at the time anywhere between $50,000 and $200,000 depending upon the
source, led to a government investigation to determine whether
any company funds had been misused to fund the festivities,
and ultimately to new laws regulating the insurance industry.28 Despite such public outcry, salaries continued to climb.
By 1928, executives running some of the largest U.S. corporations were earning as much as 1.5 million U.S. dollars (“USD”)
annually.29 Understandably, executive compensation came under sharp criticism shortly after the onset of the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt minced no words with respect to what he viewed as irresponsible business practices,
making clear in his 1933 inauguration speech his disdain for
those same executives who had ruled over commercial exchange in the pre-Depression era.30 Accordingly, the New Deal
Congress moved quickly to impose the first regulations on executive compensation, which can be found in the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Revenue
Acts of 1934, 1936, and 1938.31

27. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Executive Compensation—Why
Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L., 277, 279–80 (2007).
28. See generally PATRICIA BEARD, AFTER THE BALL (2003) (recounting
James Hyde’s lavish costume ball and describing the ensuing government
investigation and outcries for reform).
29. George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54
HARV. L. REV. 730, 734 (1941).
30. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1933), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3280.
31. See Washington, supra note 29, at 735.
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After this flurry of activity, which also included some lingering court challenges to various executive compensation packages,32 the issue remained largely dormant until the early 1990s.
The nineties saw the start of what we will call the modern executive compensation reform era, which has seen a high level of
regulation and contention and stretches into the present day. It
is marked by a cycle of targeted regulations to curb certain excesses, followed first by one or more executive pay scandals and
then by new targeted regulations to root out previously ignored
excesses perceived to have caused the problem. This era began
in 1991, when then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton included in his platform a promise to trim the over-the-top executive
compensation of the 1980s through the Tax Code by limiting
the amount companies could deduct from their taxes as reasonable and necessary compensation to 1 million USD, unless
the pay was tied to performance criteria.33 Passed into law as
Section 162(m) of the Tax Code by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Act was actually credited with allowing remuneration to spiral even higher due to its watered-down
language.34
Indeed, despite the new regulation, two executive scandals
followed shortly on its heels: the Disney case and the Enron collapse. In Disney, shareholders brought a derivative lawsuit
against Disney in 1997 for wasting corporate assets by paying
Michael Ovitz a severance package worth approximately 130
million USD, of which roughly 38.5 million USD was cash,
when he was forced out of the company after less than two
years on the job as president.35 The media coverage and the
length of time between the actual filing and the decision—a
decade or so—kept the case in the public eye and heightened

32. See Markham, supra note 27, at 282–83 (mentioning challenges to executive pay at Bethlehem Steel in 1931 and National City Bank in 1934).
33. See How Bill Clinton Helped Boost CEO Pay, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Nov.
26,
2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_48/b4011079.htm.
34. See id.; Kevin J. Ryan, Note, Rethinking Section 162(m)’s Limitation on
the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15
VA. TAX REV. 371, 371–72 (1995).
35. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35, 56–57
(Del. 2006).
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public outrage.36 Interestingly, there was no specific regulatory
backlash; that was reserved for the Enron scandal, which hit in
2001. Enron, America’s seventh largest company at the time of
its demise, was an energy company that manipulated its
statements of earnings, overstating its profits thanks in large
part to an inflated valuation mechanism and the use of offshore
accounts to mask losses and debts.37 When Enron hit its highest price of 90 USD per share in August of 2000, senior executives, knowing that the stock price was massively inflated from
the revenue manipulations, began selling their shares while
telling the general public to buy. When the true nature of Enron’s accounts was revealed, the share price plummeted, leaving shareholders with worthless shares and also leaving legions
of employees who had sunk their savings into the company
with nothing for retirement.38 The story was in the news for
months39 and spawned a library of books40 as well as an Academy Award-nominated documentary in 2006, five full years after the company entered bankruptcy.41 The movie’s tagline—
“Come see where all your money went”—encapsulated the public outrage.42 Enron was no Disney, which struggled but remained profitable. Instead, the Enron executives had fed their
36. See id.; Judge: Ovitz Can Keep $140 Million, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 10,
2005,
10:35
AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8887620/ns/businessus_business/t/judge-ovitz-can-keep-million-disney-pay/#.UNvjJI6_3fg.
37. See Dan Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM (Jan. 15, 2002,
12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/0115enron.html.
38. See Kurt Eichenwald with Diana B. Henriques, Enron Buffed Image to
a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 1; Leslie
Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in $1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1; ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (Jigsaw
Productions 2005).
39. The Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins was one of TIME’s “Persons
of the Year,” along with Cynthia Cooper and Colleen Riley, also whistleblowers. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whis(Dec.
30,
2002),
tleblowers,
TIME
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html.
40. A quick search on Amazon.com reveals an astonishing array of plays,
LUCY PREBBLE, ENRON (2011), carefully researched nonfiction by outsiders,
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004), and insider tell-alls,
BRIAN CRUVER, ENRON: ANATOMY OF GREED (2006).
41. See Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1016268/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
42. See id.
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insatiable desire for personal gain at the expense of the public,
driving the company into the ground and wiping out the pensions of far too many.43 Unstructured executive compensation
arrangements that had allowed the executives to make a “run
on the bank” were to blame.
The political reaction was swift. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”), which was passed in July 2002, contained the first real attempt to reform executive compensation through direct
regulation since President Clinton’s ill-fated initiative of the
early 1990s. Seeking to avoid another Enron-type situation, it
imposed restrictions on company stock sales during retirement
plan blackout periods, required executive pay to be disgorged in
the event of an accounting restatement, and also imposed a
freeze on extraordinary payments to executives where those
individuals were charged with violating securities laws.44 Even
if SOX had not been explicitly passed as a reaction to the outcry over Enron, as well as the similar WorldCom,45 an American public intimately familiar with the facts of the case could
see how the government was trying to shore up the system to
prevent recurrence. Two years after SOX was passed, Enron
was still affecting compensation legislation. Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Section 409A was added to the
Tax Code to try to prevent executive plunder of companies at
the expense of shareholders and employees by placing strict

43. See An Overview of the Enron Collapse: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 13–15 (2001) (statement of
Robert Vigil, Elec. Machinist Working Foreman, Portland Gen. Elec. Pelton/Round
Butte
Hydroelectric
Project),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg82282/pdf/CHRG107shrg82282.pdf; Paul Murphy, Outrage at Enron’s $55m Bonuses,
(Dec.
7,
2001),
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/dec/07/corporatefraud.enron; Don
van Natta, Jr., Bipartisan Outrage but Few Mea Culpas in Capital, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/25/business/enron-scollapse-the-impact-bipartisan-outrage-but-few-mea-culpas-in-capital.html.
44. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act—Implications for Executive Compensation,
WILL
&
EMERY
(Aug.
2002),
MCDERMOTT,
http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&p
ub=5788. Nearly all law firms have devoted significant online resources to
explaining SOX provisions to their clients and helping them with compliance.
See, e.g., id.
45. For a pessimistic take, see Liazos, supra note 6.
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limits on deferred compensation.46 It did so mainly by ensuring
that executives could not influence the timing of severance and
other payments, thereby eliminating their ability to “raid the
bank” and withdraw massive amounts when such sums were
most needed by the company to stay afloat.47
B. Culture
The new millennium also saw the rise of a new movement of
academic criticism from the legal perspective, starting with an
article published in the University of Chicago Law Review by
Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker entitled
“Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation.”48 Rather than seeing executive compensation as the result of an “optimal contract approach,” whereby
the goal is to minimize agency costs between principals (i.e.,
shareholders, who own the company) and agents hired to run
the business on their behalf (i.e., executives) so as to maximize
shareholder value,49 the authors took a darker view of the matter.50 They instead saw compensation schemes as resulting
from the “managerial power” approach. Under the “managerial
power” theory, setting compensation is not the result of an
arms-length bargain, but rather the managers’ use of their
power to inflate their salaries and extract rent payments far
higher than they deserve.51 The executive’s insatiable appetite
is not constrained by the board as another agent of the shareholders, but instead by the “outrage” their package will generate vis-à-vis the shareholders and the public at large.52 While
these “outrage costs” limit executive demand, they also incen46. See Executive Compensation After the American Jobs Creation Act,
EXEC. COMP. L. ALERT (Loeb & Loeb LLP, L.A.), Jan. 2010.
47. See id. For an overview of the ways 409A affects severance arrangements, see generally James V. Telfer & Emilie C. Mathieu, Drafting Severance Provisions in Executive Employment Agreements After I.R.C. §409A,
BENDER’S CAL. LAB. & EMP. BULL., Jan. 2008, at 20.
48. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 751, 753–54 (2002).
49. For a more detailed description of this agency relationship, see Michael
C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
50. See Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, supra note 48, at 754–55.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 756.
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tivize executives to act less than honorably, resorting to more
complicated pay structures to “camouflage” their actual compensation, including options,53 which incidentally are often
conveniently structured to be performance-related and therefore benefit from Section 162(m). The ensuing reduction in
shareholder value from these typically economically inefficient
remuneration schemes adopted largely for the sake of camouflage is one of the most pernicious results of the managerial
power approach, according to Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker.54
They go on to cite numerous examples of perverse pay practices
that can only be explained by a managerial power approach,
including use of in-the-money options, option repricing, and
golden parachute payments.55
This argument—later the basis for a book co-authored by
Bebchuk and Fried, Pay Without Performance—has changed
the way that executive compensation is discussed and regulated in the United States.56 By highlighting the endemic structural problem in executive compensation, Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker established a causal link between corporate culture and
the “problem” of executive compensation.57 Subsequent litera53. Id. at 756–57.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 757–61. An in-the-money option is an option to buy a stock
for a price less than its current market value. Option repricing is a procedure
whereby stocks that are significantly out of the money, i.e., their strike price
is far greater than their fair market value, are repriced so that the strike
price is less than fair market value. Finally, a golden parachute is a payment
typically included in a CEO’s employment agreement entitling her to a significantly larger-than-usual severance payment in the event that she leaves
within a certain time period before or after a change of control (e.g., merger,
acquisition, hostile takeover, etc.).
56. It has also turned Bebchuk and Fried into household names in the executive compensation arena. Indeed, Bebchuk was asked to give expert testimony in 2007 to the House Financial Services Committee on Shareholder
Advisor Votes on Compensation. Hearing on Empowering Shareholders on
Executive Compensation Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th
Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman
and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance,
and Director of the Corporate Governance Program Harvard Law School),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/.
57. For articles exploring this topic, see Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749, 749–50
(2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem,
What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30
J. CORP. L. 675, 676 (2004).
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ture has in large part been guided by their article and falls into
two groups. The first includes those who built on various portions of what Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker had described, including further elaboration on the kinds of inefficiencies stock
options created and the risks they incentivized,58 and assessments of whether compensation consultants are truly independent or simply another tool managers use to extract higher
rents under the managerial power theory.59 The second group
includes those who try to find a solution to the problem of
managerial power posed by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, namely via some other form of control, such as transparency in the
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”) portion of a
company’s proxy statement60 or the mitigating influence of the
institutional investor.61 There have been astonishingly few articles that argue against Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s basic
premise; even Judge Richard Posner acknowledges, albeit in a
limited manner, that the pay without performance problem is
real and more dire than he had foreseen.62 He goes so far as to
suggest that colleagues who say the costs of regulation outweigh the benefits should not stand in the way of reform.63 In
evaluating political reforms since Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s
2002 publication, it is easy to identify how the dialogue around
their article has changed the concept of the problem to be fixed.
For example, the rules on taxation of deferred compensation
passed in 2004 and required to be implemented for all existing
compensation arrangements by December 31, 2008, essentially
58. See Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the
Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk-Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1055 (2007); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of
Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2011).
59. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247 (2009).
60. For further discussion about how regulation and transparency may be
a bad thing, see Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, 3 Eur. Company L. 64 (2006).
61. See Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation, 58 J. FIN. 2351 (2003); Gavin S. Smith & Peter L.
Swan, Too Good to Be True: Do Concentrated Institutional Investors Really
Reduce Executive Compensation Whilst Raising Incentives?, (20th Australasian Fin. and Banking Conf. 2007, Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=979525.
62. Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if
Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L. J. 1013, 1045–47 (2009).
63. Id.
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force companies to set a rigid payment structure in place or
else face excise taxes that can essentially wipe out the value of
any payments.64 Thus, the Tax Code structures the timing of
the payments,65 not the executive or the board because, as established by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s premise, the two are
colluding, whether or not they mean to. The clear implication is
that the parties negotiating executive compensation are not to
be trusted. The clearest result of Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker’s
influence, however, was the U.S. legislative reaction to the
2007 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to require a very clear disclosure tactic to cut through the camouflage—the comparison of CEO pay to median pay, a rule which
has yet to be implemented.66
C. Dodd-Frank
The 2007 financial crisis was arguably the first great economic crisis in America for which compensation explicitly bore a
significant amount of the blame, which is perhaps why the legislative response was slightly broader than prior targeted attempts.67 Though the cause of the crisis was largely deemed to

64. See Telfer & Mathieu, supra note 47. For this reason, law firms started
warning their clients about compliance early on in 2008. For example, Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe’s Compensation & Benefits group sent out two client
alerts in 2008 within the space of a month and a half: one on July 31, 2008
and another on September 15, 2008. See Compensation and Benefits Publications,
Alerts,
ORRICK,
http://www.orrick.com/publications/practice_alerts.asp?practiceID=9&practic
e=Compensation%20and%20Benefits (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
65. See Telfer & Mathieu, supra note 47.
66. The SEC was supposed to issue these rulings between July and December of 2012. See SEC Updates Its Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Schedule,
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 3, 2012, 11:25 AM),
http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/corporategovernance/blog.aspx?entry=137.
However, as of press time, no final regulations have been issued; the rulemaking is noticeably absent from the SEC’s list of “accomplishments,” which
includes both proposed and finalized regulations. Implementing Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Accomplishments, U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/doddfrank/accomplishments.shtml#cgov (last modified Feb. 6, 2013).
67. In the Great Depression, criticism of executive compensation came
afterwards as part of a continuing pattern of trouble in America, and the
small 2001–2002 recession had more to do with the tech bubble bursting and
9/11 than it ever did with compensation. However, given that even these ma-
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be the real estate bubble and the sale of derivatives that packaged the resulting mortgages together,68 investment in these
toxic financial products was seen as being a matter of executive
compensation.69 More specifically, these funds were created,
sold, and chosen as investment vehicles because they brought
significant short-term gain, which CEO compensation packages
were geared to reward.70 Even before analyses of the roots of
the financial crisis came to the fore, tempers were already flaring over the division of riches: while the American economy fell
headlong into recession, layoffs and all, during the fall and
winter of 2008 to 2009, the very banks that had been propped
up by taxpayer money were preparing to pay millions in bonuses.71 The restrictions on executive pay to ailing financial institutions receiving federal aid contained in the October 2008
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”)72 and the appointment of a federal “Pay Czar” to oversee pay packages at
such institutions did little to calm the ensuing furor. In January 2009, a bill was introduced in the Senate to limit total executive compensation at bailed-out financial institutions to a
total of 400,000 USD.73 In introducing the bill, sponsor Senator
Claire McCaskill “call[ed] Wall Street executives ‘a bunch of
idiots’ who were ‘kicking sand in the face of the American taxpayer.’”74 Though the final EESA regulations, which were also
jor economic setbacks only resulted in highly specific regulation, as described
above, passing a broader package is no small feat.
68. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xvi.
69. Id. at 64.
70. Id.
71. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, If This Won’t Kill the Bonus, What Will?, N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Oct.
7,
2008,
3:06
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/if-this-wont-kill-the-bonus-what-will/.
72. See generally Executive Pay Restrictions for TARP Recipients: An Assessment: Hearing on TARP and Executive Compensation Restrictions Before
the U.S. Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Kevin J.
Murphy, Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance, University of Southern California Marshall School of Business) [hereinafter Murphy, Hearing on TARP],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698973. As
a point of comparison, according to an annual Associated Press survey, in
2007, U.S. CEOs of S&P 500 companies on average in 2007 earned over 8
million dollars. Ely Portillo, CEO Pay on the Rise, WCNC.COM, (June 19,
2011,
6:31
PM),
http://www.wcnc.com/news/CEO-pay-on-the-rise124164279.html.
73. Murphy, Hearing on TARP, supra note 72, at 5.
74. Id.
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“blended” with additional compensation regulations proposed
by the Obama team, were indeed comprehensive and changed
executive pay at least in the short run,75 the restrictions only
applied to those institutions that had accepted emergency
funds from the government, namely large firms in the financial
sector.76 As such, EESA fits within the general piecemeal pattern of prior regulation. The situation also offered a sort of perfect storm for more stringent regulations: given that these
companies were arguably being kept afloat by taxpayer money,
the government had viable leverage to impose restrictions far
more severe than it would have otherwise been able to. Indeed,
the financial institutions found these restrictions so onerous
that many hurried to repay federal assistance solely for the
purpose of regaining control over their compensation policies.77
The first attempt at comprehensive pay regulation to deal
with the broader lessons of the Great Recession came almost
two years after EESA in Dodd-Frank, signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.78 Over a year in the making, the
law was contentious from the start, passing only on party-line
voting under a Democratic Congress,79 and drew its power
largely from the authority granted to it to regulate public companies under the Securities and Exchange Acts. Rather than
treating the symptoms, it aimed to stem the cause of the problems, with the ambitious aim of combating the compensation
failures at public companies that had more broadly hastened,
or at least contributed to, the onset of the financial crisis.80 Under Dodd-Frank, public companies are required to give shareholders a non-binding say-on-pay vote at least once every three
years; implement and disclose a clawback policy; disclose
whether the CEO and chairman positions are held by the same
person and if so, why; ensure its compensation committee
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 8–9.
See id. at 4, 8–9.
See Brill, supra note 11.
See Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A3.
79. See Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST,
July 16, 2010, at A1; David Dayen, Dodd-Frank Passes House, FIREDOGLAKE
(June 30, 2010, 4:02 PM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/30/dodd-frankpasses-house/.
80. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg163.aspx.
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members are fully independent, not unlike audit committee
members, and wield certain oversight responsibilities; and
draft annual proxy statements that contain a clear description
of the relationship between executive compensation and the
company’s performance as well as the ratio of the median of all
salaries, excluding that of the CEO, to the CEO’s compensation.81
Dodd-Frank, then, would seem to imply a new era of executive compensation regulation in the United States, providing
investors with new information and giving them a say on compensation which, while non-binding, has been shown, at the
very least, to mitigate so-called “pay for failure.”82 However, the
law remains highly contentious. Republicans in particular are
vociferous in calling for its repeal, in whole or in part; the financial industry has spent a great deal of money lobbying
against it; and the law has also suffered setbacks in court.83 In
addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
charged with enacting many of the rules and regulations to
81. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of
Dodd-Frank 2 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698898; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—an Overview, TO THE POINT, Fall 2010, at 1, 1, 7, available at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/assets/to-the-point-fall2010.pdf.
82. See, e.g., Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Vote and CEO
Compensation: Evidence from the UK, J. FIN. (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394.
83. See House Republicans Give Dodd-Frank a Failing Grade, REUTERS,
July 15, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/usfinancial-regulation-republicans-idUSTRE76E4W120110715; Ben Protess,
Wall Street Continues to Spend Big on Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug.
1, 2011, 2:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/wall-streetcontinues-to-spend-big-on-lobbying/. Republicans have also introduced several bills to try to overrule various portions of the law. See Meredith Shiner,
GOP Begins Rollback of Wall St. Reform, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2011, 8:50
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51458.html#ixzz1GtVghkik.
For examples of setbacks in court and explanations as to why so many cases
have gone against the SEC, see Ben Protess, Court Ruling Offers Path to
Challenge Dodd-Frank, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 17, 2011, 8:41 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/court-ruling-offers-path-to-challengedodd-frank/; Eugene Scalia, Why Dodd-Frank Rules Keep Losing in Court,
ST.
J.
(Oct.
3,
2012,
7:04
PM),
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444004704578032223012816
236.html.

598

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

carry out the law, including all of the executive compensation
provisions, is woefully behind on its rule-making schedule.84
According to a one-year anniversary report on the progress
made in implementing Dodd-Frank published by the law firm
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, as of July 22, 2011, regulators
had only completed thirty-three of the 163 required rulemakings; in other words, they had only met roughly 20% of the
rulemaking requirements in the year following Dodd-Frank’s
passage.85 Furthermore, executive compensation has received
only secondary attention—the top five topics for meetings with
outside groups on proposed regulations as of the one-year anniversary did not include executive compensation.86 Rulemaking
has also progressed at a slow pace: while say-on-pay rules were
promulgated in January 2011, it was not until a year and a
half later in June 2012 that the SEC re-visited the topic of executive compensation, and no rules have been issued in the
months since.87
Where, then, does this leave executive compensation reform
in America? Those who had hoped that Dodd-Frank might answer that question are left unsatisfied, with major topics left
unanswered. But perhaps that is part of the answer: we have
yet to truly commit to enacting the necessary rules. On the one
side, businesses have complained loudly about how onerous the
regulations are, particularly the CEO-to-mean salary ratio.88
On the other side, public ire is alive and well. An article in The
84. See Reese Darragh, Dodd-Frank, One Year Later, COMPLIANCE WEEK
(July 26, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/dodd-frank-one-yearlater/printarticle/208135/.
85. Dodd-Frank Progress Report: One-Year Anniversary Report, DAVIS
POLK
&
WARDWELL
(July
22,
2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/072211_Dodd_Frank_Progress_R
eport.pdf. The two-year anniversary report showed a slight increase: 30% of
the overall required rulemaking to date has in fact occurred. Dodd-Frank
Progress Report: Two-Year Anniversary Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (July 18, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-ProgressReport/ (follow “Access Report” hyperlink under “Dodd-Frank Two-Year Anniversary Progress Report”).
86. Dodd-Frank Progress Report: One-Year Anniversary Report, supra note
85.
87. Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Accomplishments, supra note 66.
88. Arielle Bikard, Debate Heats up over CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/debateheats-up-over-ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure/printarticle/199177/.
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Washington Post in the summer of 2011 drew strings of heated
comments from readers,89 to say nothing of the Occupy Wall
Street movement. Even the Pay Czar himself, Ken Feinberg,
has grown tired of the refrain that increased pay regulation
will mean a mass departure of all the “best and the brightest”
from the very firms that need them the most.90 In addition,
while Dodd-Frank’s specific executive compensation changes
were built on solid principles, they remain, to a certain degree,
pointed: disclosure is to be changed here, requirements upgraded there, without articulating a true philosophy that could
give investors and companies alike a default. With this in
mind, it is interesting to turn to Germany—a country that enacted a law quickly, which also came into force quickly—to see
whether the United States might learn lessons that could alter
the debate and instigate real change.
II. GERMAN BACKGROUND
A. Compensation Culture
Though compensation culture in Germany diverges sharply
from that in the United States in many respects, they have at
least one point in common: excessive compensation in Germany
is also hotly debated in politics, the media, and academic research.91 The uproar two years ago caused by the fifty million
euro severance package paid to the exiting CEO of Porsche,
Wendelin Wiedeking, is a story similar to many of the excessive
compensation narratives in the U.S. media.92 It is, however,
89. Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay, Rich Pull away from the Rest of
America,
Comments,
WASH.
POST,
(June
18,
2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-18/business/35234600_1_incomegap-personal-income-capital-gains.
90. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, A Conversation with Kenneth Feinberg (Mar. 4, 2010) (transcript
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/conversation-kennethfeinberg/p21614).
91. Ann-Kristin Achleitner et al., Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstadsvergütung
in
börsennotierten
Unternehmen:
Familienversus
NichtFamilienunternehmen [Selected Aspects of Executive Remuneration in Listed
Firms: Family vs. Non-Family Firms], 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 113, 113–118 (2010).
92. See William Boston, Is Porsche’s Exiting Boss a Symbol of Capitalist
Excess?,
TIME
(July
25,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912669,00.html.
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worth noting that unlike what his American counterpart likely
would have done, Wiedeking not only requested a more modest
amount, but also almost immediately promised to donate half
of his payout to a charity sponsored by Porsche.93 Rather than
the exception, Wiedeking is the product of a different compensation culture than the United States, one where executive
compensation has only recently reached heights of extraordinary contention. This was due, likely not in small part, to the
fact that executive compensation remained relatively low until
around the end of the twentieth century. In 1997, Focus, a
German magazine, published an article claiming that German
executives were underpaid given the results they produced.94
An examination of the list of top earners in both countries underlined the point. While the top executives at DaimlerChrysler, BMW, VEBA, and Siemens in Germany earned between 2 and 3.5 million deutschmarks per year, their American
counterparts at Daimler-Chrysler, GE, Intel and Healthsouth
earned between 20 and 181 million deutschmarks.95
Two historical reasons help explain the imbalance. First,
German public companies are governed by the Aktiengesetz,
which for a long time did not allow them to offer the kinds of
stock option plans that had been pushing executive compensation in the United States upwards.96 Thus, until around 1998,
German companies simply did not have the tools to pay their
executives on a scale anywhere equal to executives employed
by U.S. companies.97 The other reason has to do with German
corporate governance. While the United States deploys what
has been termed by some authors as “stock market” or “AngloAmerican capitalism,” Germany’s businesses have long prac93. Id.
94. See Julie Ann Elston & Lawrence G. Goldberg, Executive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1391, 1393 (2003).
95. Id. The deutschmark was rendered obsolete by the introduction of the
euro in 2000, but these sums would be respectively over 131 million USD for
the U.S. group of CEOs, and between approximately 1.5 and 2.5 million USD
for the German CEOs. See German Mark (DEM) Currency Exchange Rate
Conversion
Calculator,
COINMILL.COM,
http://coinmill.com/DEM_calculator.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). Regardless of the currency conversions, it is the scale that is impressive, with some
U.S. CEOs earning ten times what their German counterparts did.
96. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case
of Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 511 (2001).
97. See id.
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ticed “welfare capitalism” instead.98 Under the Anglo-American
model, the company is seen as being run for the benefit of the
shareholders, which means stock value is paramount, along
with the mutually reinforcing institutions that allow this value
to properly reflect that of the company, including disclosure
and accounting rules promoting a full and fair depiction of the
company, and hostile takeovers, by which an inefficient management board is replaced by another that will better run the
company for the shareholders.99 The company is highly capitalized and has a dispersed shareholder base.100 Welfare capitalism, on the other hand, prioritizes all of the stakeholders of the
company, from employees to creditors to shareholders.101
Groups of influential stakeholders tend to be employees and
banks, who, as insiders, benefit from strong information disclosure, as opposed to outsiders, who receive far less information
than under the Anglo-American model.102 The company is not
as highly capitalized, seeking much of its financing from banks
that have close ties to the company as shareholders and major
creditors.103 The difference in models has a significant impact
on executive compensation, among other strategic decisions.104
The argument for share-based compensation theoretically
makes a great deal more sense under the Anglo-American
model, because it ties the interests of the executive to those of
the constituency he or she is expected to serve. Under welfare
capitalism, the argument goes, executive compensation will be
kept low because of the influence of employees and creditors on
the compensation-setting process. In short, welfare capitalism
should, in theory, be more egalitarian and more sustainable
than the Anglo-American model.105

98. Trevor Buck & Azura Shahrim, The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes Across National Cultures: The Case of Germany, 36 J. INT’L
BUS. STUD. 42, 43 (2005).
99. Id.
100. See Cheffins, supra note 96, at 498–99.
101. Buck & Shahrim, supra note 98, at 43.
102. Id.
103. See HORST SIEBERT, THE GERMAN ECONOMY: BEYOND THE SOCIAL
MARKET 228–29 (2005); GRUNDMANN, supra note 19, at 333.
104. Buck & Shahrim, supra note 98, at 43.
105. See id. at 48; Cheffins, supra note 96, at 500–01.
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However, in the past ten years, much ink has been spilled
proclaiming the end of welfare capitalism.106 The two largest
executive compensation sensations in Germany prior to the financial crisis (and to Wiedeking’s severance controversy) both
spurred public outrage and served as examples to prove that
changing compensation structures marked a shift away from
welfare capitalism, bringing with it the need for increased regulation. The first of these sensations was the Daimler-Chrysler
merger at the end of the 1990s. As pointed out in numerous articles at the time, the difference in compensation philosophy
and actual pay at the two companies was astonishing. In 1997,
the entire management board of Daimler—ten people—
collectively earned two million USD less than the vicechairman of Chrysler alone.107 Though some suggested that the
Americans would have to tone down their monetary expectations, at least one compensation expert read the cards right,
saying, “Over time, you’ll see the Daimler-Chrysler executive
pay practice evolve into something much closer to what Chrysler management is used to.”108 Indeed, in 2000, DaimlerChrysler implemented a five-year American-style stock option
plan, covering some 4000 non-U.S. executives.109 By 2004, a
mere six years after the merger, Daimler-Chrysler faced wrath
from all sides, including the former CEO of Daimler-Benz, because executive pay had risen 130% even as the company was
preparing to announce layoffs.110 Politicians, both liberal and
106. See Harald Baum, Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The
German Experience, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS,
STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 3, 14 (Klaus J. Hopt et al.
eds., 2005); Cheffins, supra note 96, at 501; Nuno G. Fernandes et al., Are US
CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence 28 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 255/2009, 2012), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341639.
107. DaimlerChrysler Will Face Wide Gap in Executive Pay, WARDSAUTO
(June
1,
1998),
http://wardsautoworld.com/ar/auto_daimlerchrysler_face_wide/.
108. Id. Cf. Joseph Sargent, What Daimler-Chrysler Means to Shareholders,
12 GLOB. FIN. 8 (1998) (“Daimler shareholders fear that executive pay will
skyrocket.”).
109. Kemba J. Dunham, Why US-Based Executives Get Paid More,
EXPATICA.COM (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.expatica.com/hr/story/why-usbased-executives-get-paid-more-10840.html.
110. Deutsche Welle Staff, Calls Go out to Limit Executive Salaries,
WELLE
(July
21,
2004),
http://www.dwDEUTSCHE
world.de/dw/article/0,,1273121,00.html.
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conservative, were quick to condemn the payments,111 and in
the face of the outrage and strikes by employees, executives
agreed to forego up to 10% of their pay.112
Also in 2004, another major compensation sensation exploded
in Germany. January marked the start of the Ackermann trial
as a result of the Mannesmann affair,113 Germany’s version of
the Disney litigation. In November 1999, Vodafone launched a
hostile bid to take over Mannesmann AG, a German cell phone
company.114 Following the lead of its CFO, Klaus Esser, shareholders rejected the deal of 240 euro per share (Mannesmann
had, at the time, a market value of 203 euro per share), and
hostilities continued between the companies until a final deal
was reached giving the shareholders 360 euro per share.115 On
the heels of the deal, Esser was awarded a 10 million pound
sterling bonus by members of the supervisory board, including
Ackermann.116 The reaction by the public was overwhelmingly
negative, but the bonus was paid nevertheless, and a month
later, the federal attorney’s office in Düsseldorf filed charges
against the responsible members of the board, inter alia, alleging a breach of trust.117 The matter was ultimately settled out
of court with a payment of 5.8 million euro.118
Though there were no further large severance payment scandals until Wiedeking’s in 2007, the stage had already been set.
Despite a relative lack of scandals and a shorter history of outrage, executive compensation became an issue as much ingrained in the public ire in Germany as it was in the United

111. Id.
112. Just-Auto.com Editorial Team, Government Welcomes DaimlerChrysler
Offer to Cut Board Member Pay in Working Hours Dispute, JUST-AUTO.COM,
July
19,
2004,
http://www.just-auto.com/news/government-welcomesdaimlerchrysler-offer-to-cut-board-member-pay-in-working-hoursdispute_id69013.aspx.
113. Ackermann Criticizes German Law at Mannesmann Trial, BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
21,
2004),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKzAkqAtscS0
&refer=europe.
114. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light 7 (Feb. 26, 2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965596.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 9.
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States. Beyond that, however, there are few similarities. Perhaps these few scandals were treated with such venom because, in a country used to relatively modest compensation,
these offenses seemed particularly egregious. Or perhaps the
reaction was a call of alarm, channeling a sense that change
was indeed afoot and that compensation was shifting to astronomical proportions, much to the dissatisfaction of many.119
B. Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Regulation in Germany
1. German Level
Generally speaking, Germany got into the corporate governance game relatively late. Unlike the United States, Germany
is an entirely code-based system—new laws must be enacted by
the Bundestag, which, for the majority of the country’s postWorld War II history, was reluctant to enact changes in corporate law.120 Whereas many corporate governance provisions in
the United States tend to be enacted administratively, through
the SEC—such as the requirement of a CD&A section or the
recent addition of say-on-pay under Dodd-Frank—Germany
has no SEC equivalent, and capital market law, far from being
advanced to the point of a corporate governance tool, was barely regulated.121
It is also possible that corporate structure played a role.
Whereas in the United States, a public company is run by a
single board of directors consisting of company management,
such as the CEO and CFO, as well as directors from outside the
company, a public company in Germany (an “Aktiengesellschaft” or “AG”) has two boards, or more precisely, a two-tier
119. See generally, e.g., Michael Adams, Vorstandsvergütungen—Die Fälle
Mannesman und DaimlerChrysler, in REGULIERUNG, WETTBEWERB UND
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT / REGULATION, COMPETITION, AND THE MARKET ECONOMY.
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR C.-C. VON WEIZSÄCKER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 295–364 (Hans
G. Nutzinger ed., 2003). Since reunification, however, reform has proceeded
at a significantly sharper pace, both on the national and European Level,
enacting essentially significant reform every other year since 1998. For excellent coverage of European and German national corporate governance, see
Section 14 GRUNDMANN, supra note 19.
120. See Gerald Spindler, Scandals, Regulation, and Supervisory Agencies,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES AND MARKETS
IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US, supra note 106, at 112–13.
121. See id.
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board.122 One board, a management board called the Vorstand,
is composed of “inside” directors who are employed by the company and typically includes the CEO, CFO, and other important executives.123 Under the Aktiengesetz, the law governing AGs, the Vorstand is charged with running the company,
which it does in accordance with its own business rules and
judgment.124 The other board, a supervisory board called the
“Aufsichtsrat”, is made up of “outside” directors whose task is
to supervise the work of the Vorstand and how it manages the
company.125 The Aufsichtsrat cannot specifically instruct the
Vorstand, but it must be consulted on certain important matters and formally approve the financial statements.126 With a
formal supervisory system built into the AG, which contains its
own strict demands in terms of organization, accounting, and
legal housekeeping,127 perhaps the need for Anglo-American
style corporate governance measures becomes less pressing.128
In any case, change came from without, not from within, in
the form of global competition. With the increasing AngloAmericanization of the international business world, retaining
investors required investing in the Anglo-American corporate
governance model.129 For international business, the New York
Stock Exchange remains paramount, and companies listed on
that exchange must comply—to differing extent for domestic
and foreign companies—with the corporate governance provisions woven into the fabric of the SEC regulations.130 Though
foreign listed companies must comply with fewer disclosure re122. GERHARD WIRTH ET AL., CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY 71–72 (rev. 2d ed.
2010).
123. Id. at 71–72, 100.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 116.
126. Id. at 100, 116–17.
127. Id. at 71.
128. Dr. Carsten Jungmann, The Dualism of One-Tier and Two-Tier Board
Systems in Europe, Summer School on European Business Law 2008, Düsseldorf Law School, http://www.duslaw.eu/de/veranstaltungen/intensiv/summerschool/2008-08-04.
129. See Baum, supra note 106, at 18; Klaus J. Hopt, European Company
Law and Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT:
CORPORATIONS, STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US, supra
note 106, at 133.
130. See Ted Kamman et al., Foreign Private Issuers of Equity Securities in
the United States, JONES DAY, May 2009, at 30–31, 35–36. This is particularly
true with respect to executive compensation disclosure. See id. at 13.
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quirements, existing U.S. requirements have historically tended to be more stringent than those in Germany at any given
time. For example, disclosure of the compensation of individual
executives at public companies has only been required in Germany since the Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz
(“VorstOG”) came into power on August 11, 2005;131 the U.S.
requirement to disclose the compensation of the CEO and the
four highest paid officers, who would typically sit on the
Vorstand if the company were German, has been required since
1994.132 Investors were used to seeing NYSE-listed DAX 30
companies like Siemens and Deutsche Bank reveal this information; therefore, it is little wonder that they might have soon
questioned why the same information was not available from
other German companies like Lufthansa and BMW.133
The corporate governance debate began in earnest in Germany in the mid-1990s.134 In 2000, the German government set up
a Corporate Governance Commission charged with identifying
weaknesses in the German leadership and control systems in
place in corporations, and to modernize the German system in
light of increased globalization and international competition.135 In July 2001, the Commission presented its report, the
fruit of twelve months of intensive discussion and international
comparison, particularly with the British Company Law Steering Group.136 Many of the most important themes of the report
could be categorized as allowing for better policing of the relationship between the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand. The report

131. Sybille Flindt, German-listed Companies Now Required to Disclose
Board Member Remuneration, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY: UPDATE FROM
GERMANY,
April
2006,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.mwe.com/info/news/gu0406.pdf.
132. Robert Lavasseur, Executive Compensation in the Public and Private
Sectors, www.mcdowallassociates.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
133. This ripple effect of U.S. public company regulation makes compensation disclosure in the United States all the more interesting and powerful—
there are fewer opportunities to influence policy worldwide than via this avenue.
134. MATTHIAS HORNBERG, DIE REGELUNGEN ZUR BEAUFSICHTIGUNG DER
GESCHÄFTSFÜHRUNG IM DEUTSCHEN UND BRITISCHEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
KODEX [THE RULES FOR SUPERVISION OF MANAGEMENT IN GERMAN AND BRITISH
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 62 (2005).
135. Id. at 64–65.
136. Id. at 66. Thanks to this rapport, there was a direct influence of the
Anglo-American model on the report.
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stressed bettering the mechanisms that make information
available to the Aufsichtsrat, increasing the negative consequences of failure in their duties, and rendering Vorstand compensation more transparent through the development of a corporate governance code.137 Accordingly, a Government Commission (Regierungskommission Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex) was established in September 2001 with the express purpose of drafting precisely such a document138 and it
was adopted by the government on February 26, 2002, and
signed into law in July of that same year.139
An understanding of the German Corporate Governance Code
(the “Code”) and its history is important because the Code continues to set the tone for corporate governance in Germany.
The themes identified by the Corporate Governance Commission not only served as the centerpiece of the final Code, but
also run through corporate governance and reform attempts to
this day, including the VorstAG.140 The Code provides comprehensive corporate governance guidance by both restating applicable law already in force in the corporate governance arena
and adding new material in the form of sixty-eight recommendations and sixteen suggestions, which are aimed at improving
transparency and heightening the trust of international investors.141 The Code is made up of seven chapters: a foreword, a
chapter on shareholders and the annual meeting, a chapter on
cooperation between the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat, and separate chapters on the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat, transparency,

137. Id. at 66–67. Interestingly, these general themes not only helped
mould the German Corporate Governance Code, but also seem to serve as
guiding principles that continue to influence the development of further corporate governance mechanisms in Germany. The VorstOG and VorstAG run
very much along these lines.
138. Dr. Gerhard Cromme, Chairman of the Gov’t Comm’n on the German
Corporate Governance Code, Address at the Press Conference Following the
Handing over of the German Corporate Governance Code (Feb. 26, 2002),
available
at
http://www.corporate-governance-Code.de/eng/news/redecromme-20020226.html.
139. German Corporate Governance Code, COMM’N OF THE GERMAN
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
CODE,
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/index-e.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
140. Hornberg, supra note 134, at 66–67.
141. See Alexander Bassen et al., Behind Broad Corporate Governance Aggregates 2 (Apr. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965355.
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and financial statements.142 The recommendations within the
Code themselves are technically not binding, but rather function on a “comply-or-explain” basis.143 That is, under Section
161 of the Aktiengesetz, publicly traded companies must disclose annually the extent to which they have complied with the
recommendations in the Code and describe the reasons for any
non-compliance.144 The failure to comply with suggestions, on
the other hand, need not be addressed.145 This mechanism was
chosen because it was deemed to allow companies whose structures did not necessitate certain rules the ability to deviate
from them. With flexibility being one of the guiding points for
the Code, the idea was not to corset companies into inflexible
structures.146 An additional advantage of the comply-or-explain
142. Id. The German Corporate Governance Code is available in its entirety
in DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE], Feb. 26, 2002 (Ger.), translated in German Corporate
Governance Code, COMM’N OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
(May
15,
2012),
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf.
143. Bassen, supra note 141, at 2.
144. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at
1089, last amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 24, 2004, BGBL. I at 2198, § 161
(Ger.); see also GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE §1. Under the Green
Paper on “The EU Corporate Governance Framework,” companies may in the
future also be required to explain why they did not comply. GRUNDMANN, supra note 19, at 328. However, many of the DAX 30 already engage in this
practice.
145. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE §1. From a U.S. perspective,
the “comply or explain” approach is a bit odd: American corporate governance
provisions are mandatory with dire consequences that include delisting from
an exchange (for example, per SEC and NASDAQ rules) or paying excise and
other taxes (for example, per Section 162(m) or 280G of the Tax Code). For a
discussion with respect to the SEC and NASDAQ rules, see Frequently Asked
OMX
LISTING
CENTER,
Questions,
NASDAQ
https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/Show_Doc.aspx?File=FAQsContinued.ht
ml (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). For a discussion of the tax consequences under
162(m) and 280(G), see generally Section 162(m): Requirements, Implications
and Practical Concerns, EXEQUITY, Sept. 2008; Christian McBurney, Golden
Parachute Planning a Key in Acquisitions of Public Companies, NIXON
PEABODY
TAX
ALERT,
Nov.
2003,
available
at
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/TA_11002003.pdf,
respectively.
146. See Cromme, supra 138. For a discussion as to whether the Code actually provides this flexibility, see generally Paul Sanderson et al., Flexible or
Not? The Comply-or-Explain Principle in UK and German Corporate Governance (Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 407,
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method is that theoretically it allows the market to be the ultimate arbitrator.147 In other words, shareholders will vote with
their feet should they deem corporate governance provisions
insufficient.148
The problem with comply-or-explain, however, is that it assumes there are active shareholders who are informed about
the different provisions in the Code and disclosure levels in
general. It further assumes that disclosure levels would trump
other considerations such that a particular company with a
very low disclosure level would make investment so unattractive to these active, informed shareholders that they would be
willing to sell their shares because the company has not complied with a Corporate Governance Code provision, even when
the company might otherwise be doing well. The German government has thus taken an approach to corporate governance
that might best be described as “recommendation plus.” Whenever companies are not sufficiently following recommendations
or suggestions in the Code, the government tends to turn them
into binding law. A prime example deals with the disclosure of
individualized compensation figures. In 2002, it was a suggestion. In 2003, it became a recommendation.149 Finally, due to
high levels of noncompliance, the VorstOG made it binding law
in 2005.150 The reports of the group in charge of administering
and updating the Code read like a preview of coming attractions, with contentious items or provisions with low levels of
compliance later the subject of mandatory regulation.151 In a

2010), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp407.pdf. By way of example, comply-or-explain provisions would greatly alleviate the controversy surrounding the mean salary disclosure requirement in Dodd-Frank.
147. See Cromme, supra 138.
148. See id.
149. Joerg-Markus Hitz & Jörg R. Werner, Why Do Firms Resist Individualized Disclosure of Management Remuneration? 6 (Oct. 4, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588186. According to a
press release from March 11, 2005, in 2004, only 9 of the DAX 30 companies
had published individualized executive compensation disclosure. Commission
of the Corporate Governance Code Press Release, http://www.corporategovernance-Code.de/eng/archiv/index.html.
150. Hitz & Werner, supra note 149, at 5.
151. See, e.g., Press Release, German Comm’n of the German Corporate
Governance Code, Statement by Dr. Gerhard Cromme on Disclosure of Management
Board
Compensation
(Mar.
11,
2005),
available
at
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press release dated March 11, 2005, for example, the chair of
the Government Commission mentioned that the ability of a
member of the Vorstand to accede directly to the Aufsichtsrat
upon his retirement from the former remained a hotly debated
topic. Few careful readers should have been surprised, then,
when the definitive answer to this question came as part of the
VorstAG three years later.152
2. European-Level Governance Initiatives
In 2013, it is impossible to speak of the corporate governance
environment and developments in Germany without addressing the broader European picture.153 The European Union154
has long been active in the realm of business law—indeed, one
of the motivations driving unification was the desire to harmonize business law to help Europe compete with the United
States as an attractive location for merger and acquisition activity.155 Since 2000, the European Union has become increasingly active in corporate governance, a natural extension of its
business law activism. On some level, corporate governance is
about the decisions in a market economy that matter most for
the public at-large, which includes investors.156 Corporate governance measures, therefore, are of key importance for investors, providing some level assurance that the company into
which they are sinking their money will be run according to
certain accepted principles. What better way to win the global
competition for investment than by using unified corporate
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/11_03_2005_14_Uhr_PM_Zypries_EN.pdf.
152. Under the VorstAG, such a transition is only possible following a twoyear cooling-off period, absent shareholder approval to the contrary. Press
release, Commission on German Corporate Governance Kodex,
Regierungskommission passt Kodexbeschlüsse im Zuge des Gesetzes zur
Angemessenheit der Vorstandvergütung an (June 19, 2009), available at
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/ger/download/PM_Kodexanpassungen_VorstAG.pdf.
153. Indeed, it is now possible to speak of European company law as a body
of company law applicable to companies headquartered in the EU. For more
on European Company Law as a field and its advent, through the implementation of Directives and otherwise, see generally GRUNDMANN, supra note 19.
154. European Union here refers to the European Union as well as the European Commission, as the entity was called prior to the Treaty of Lisbon.
155. See generally GRUNDMANN, supra note 19, §29.I.
156. Id. at 321.
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governance measures as a way to appeal to foreign investors,
who might otherwise be wary of determining which provisions
apply in a particular country?
The EU signaled its entry into the corporate governance fray
in 2003. In that year the European Commission (“EC”), the
forerunner of the EU, published an Action Plan on “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance,” the
template for future corporate governance reform initiatives.157
Like the German Code, the Action Plan was based on a report
by high-level European company law experts.158 That the EC’s
Competitiveness Counsel had commissioned the report further
lent support to the idea that global competition for investors
was a key concern.159 The Action Plan formed the standing European Corporate Governance Forum, the body essentially
tasked with carrying out the Action Plan, particularly with respect to encouraging coordination of national corporate governance codes.160 Its role is essentially to track corporate governance measures and reforms by publishing and commissioning
corporate governance evaluations of member countries.161
These reports exert indirect pressure on governments, as they
make it very clear to potential investors which countries comply with which rules and which countries have better or worse
track records.162
Despite the plethora of corporate governance institutions, the
EC/EU has historically produced little in the way of broadly
157. See Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance
in the European
Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003).
158. Id. at 4.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 16–17. For more on the role of the European Corporate Governance and their past activities, see European Corporate Governance Forum,
COMMISSION,
EUROPEAN
http://ec.Europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2012).
161. European Corporate Governance Forum, supra note 160.
162. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Application by the Member States of the EU of the Commission Recommendation on
the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and
on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board, SEC (2007) 1021 (July 13,
2007). Independent studies have also been done that track reform efforts.
See, e.g., EUGENIA UNANYANTS-JACKSON, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: A PANEUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, (Alan
Brett ed., 2006), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=642651.
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applicable, binding executive compensation regulation.163 Efforts to date have yielded only one binding directive related to
remuneration,164 Directive 2010/76/EU, which requires financial institutions to implement “remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management.”165
Aside from this directive, the EC/EU has typically handled remuneration matters by recommendation, which unlike directives, are not required to be implemented by member countries.166 The first recommendation on director’s pay came in
2004, shortly after the EC began to step up its corporate governance efforts.167 This non-binding recommendation suggested
that companies release a statement on general remuneration
policy, include the matter in the agenda for the shareholders
meeting, disclose individual executive remuneration, and require shareholder approval of share-based remuneration
plans.168 Additional recommendations were issued in 2009, in
the wake of a 2007 report discussing compliance with the 2004
recommendation and the financial crisis.169 These new recommendations were far more precise and showed a more nuanced
understanding of executive compensation and how it needed to
be reformed, with eight separate recommendations that addressed the structure of directors’ remuneration as well as the
process of setting the remuneration.170 The recommendations

163. For a history of the European Commission’s involvement with remuCOMMISSION,
neration,
see
Remuneration
Policies,
EUROPEAN
http://ec.Europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
164. Id.
165. European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/76, 2010 O.J. (L 329)
3,
3
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:329:0003:0035:EN:P
DF [hereinafter Directive 2010/76].
166. See Remuneration Policies, supra note 163.
167. Press Release, European Union, Directors’ Pay–Commission Sets Out
Guidance on Disclosure and Shareholder Control (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://Europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1183&format
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
168. Id.
169. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector, at 2, 3, SEC (2009) 580 (April 30, 2009).
170. Press Release, European Union, Directors’ Pay: Commission Sets Out
Further Guidance on Structure and Determination of Directors’ Remuneration,
(Apr.
29,
2009),
available
at
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suggested, among other things, clawbacks, increasing the link
between pay and performance, requiring a balance between
fixed and variable pay, and a number of other targeted
measures.171 Some might question whether the VorstAG was
influenced by this latest round of recommendations, which was
made public on April 29, 2009, only a few months before the
passage of the VorstAG.172 However, this seems unlikely. While
the VorstAG was not yet in force when the recommendations
were published, it had already been proposed, with comments
well underway, none of which reference the new European recommendations.173 It is also worth remembering that much of
what became law in the VorstAG had existed in the German
Corporate Governance Code, a document that the EC/EU policies took into account when framing their recommendations.174
http://Europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/673&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
171. Id.
172. Id. This is not also the first time that Germany has overtaken EU initiatives, essentially preempting EU directives on specific matters. The Gesetz
über die aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an die Vergütungssysteme von
Instituten und Versicherungsunternehmen, Germany’s post-financial crisis
banking law, which also contained restrictions on banking remuneration, for
example, was initially proposed in the Fall of 2009 and finally became effective in its entirety on July 27, 2010. A description of the German law is available
at
http://www.ihkberlin.de/servicemarken/branchen/Dienstleistungen/banken/Recht_/820436/Verg
uetung.html. The EU’s related directive, Directive 2010/76/EU is dated November 24, 2010. Directive 2010/76, supra note 165.
173. Indeed the Green Party was already submitting comments about the
proposed law before it was even officially introduced by Angela Merkel’s government. See Antrag der Abgeordneten Chrintine Scheel et al und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Deutscher Bundestag, März 4, 2009,
Drucksache 16/12112, dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/121/1612112.pdf. The
FDP issued such a commentary in late 2008 along similar lines: Antrag der
Abgeordneten Mechthid Dyckmans et al und der Fraktion der FDP, Deutscher
Bundestag,
Nov.
12,
2008,
Drucksache
16/10885,
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/108/1610885.pdf.
174. An antecedent to the VorstAG’s requirement of a two-year pause between membership on the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat, for instance, was
already present in the 2007 version of the German Corporate Governance
Code, which stated that there should be “special reasons” to justify direct
accession to the Aufsichtsrat upon exit from the Vorstand. DEUTSCHER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE],
Feb. 26, 2002, as amended June 14, 2007, § 5.4.4 (Ger.), translated in German
Corporate Governance Code, COMM’N OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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In short, with the EU refraining from binding general compensation directives, executive compensation laws and reforms in
Germany are German at heart and respond to German problems from a German perspective.
C. VorstAG
1. Background and Components of the Law
By December 2007, it was clear that executive compensation
was on Angela Merkel’s agenda. In that month, she singled out
exorbitant executive salaries in her speech to the annual meeting of the Christian Democratic Union (“CDU”), the historically
conservative political party that she leads as Chancellor, criticizing “payouts in the realms of fantasy.”175 The business community was outraged, implying that she had endangered economic recovery.176 Her spokesman denied that she was planning any kind of legislation to curb executive pay, while the
opposition, the Social Democrats (“SPD”), who regarded executive pay and its reform as a staunchly liberal issue, were
amused and dismissive of what they perceived as hypocrisy,
since their previous calls for legislation had fallen on deaf
ears.177 But Merkel proved the SPD wrong. Executive compensation remained a constant, if not strident, theme for her
throughout the next year. In May 2008, Merkel’s office underlined that, in the past, she had repeatedly made clear “that
there was ‘little comprehension’ for managers departing with
large severance packages after their companies had shown a

CODE
(June
14,
2007),
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/E_Kodex_2007_final.pdf.
175. Executive Pay Debate revived in Germany, DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR,
Jan.
4,
2008,
available
at
http://www.expatica.com/fr/finance_business/business/Executive-pay-debaterevived-in-Germany_11148.html. Coming on the heels of the Wiedeking
scandal, Merkel noted, “Just because an American car executive makes a
thousand times what an employee earns, it seems a German car manager
should also get the kind of rise he would never grant his workers.” Bertrand
Benoit, Merkel in Attack on US-Style Pay Awards, FIN. TIMES UK (Dec. 4,
2007,
2:00
AM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a04f5c50-a20b-11dc-a13b0000779fd2ac.html’axzz1ZowebpvY.
176. See Letter from Berlin, supra note 20.
177. Id.
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loss,”178 and she supposedly arranged for a special task force to
review executive compensation late that summer.179 Just a few
months later, a CDU member and one of Merkel’s most important allies, Peter Müller, backed an SPD proposal similar to
section 162(m).180 At the G20 summit, Merkel was expected to,
and did, raise executive compensation reform as part of the
new, sound financial architecture for which she advocated.181
Given that it was already an important theme of her chancellorship, and with the increased scrutiny worldwide placed on
executive compensation in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
it is unsurprising that Angela Merkel proposed a new executive
compensation law in March of 2009.182 After a comment period,
during which various governmental factions as well as outside
experts submitted their views, the Bundestag passed the law
on June 28, 2009, and became effective in full on August 5,
2009.183
The three main objectives of the VorstAG were to better align
remuneration schemes with incentives for sustainable growth
in the long-term, to strengthen the independence of the
Aufsichtsrat and heighten its accountability, and to increase
transparency of executive remuneration.184 The VorstAG at178. Germany’s Social Democrats Take On Executive Pay, DEUTSCHE PRESSE
AGENTUR,
May
1,
2008,
available
at
http://www.expatica.com/de/news/local_news/Germany_s-Social-Democratstake-aim-at-executive-pay-_42635.html.
179. Executive Pay—Is Intervention Required?, LEADER.CO.ZA (Aug. 2, 2008),
http://www.leader.co.za/article.aspx?s=1&f=1&a=825.
180. See Hugh Williamson, Merkel Ally Backs Curbs on Executive Salaries,
TIMES
UK
(May
22,
2008,
3:00
AM),
FIN.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f201e98c-2799-11dd-b7cb000077b07658.html’axzz1ZowebpvY.
181. James Quinn, Merkel and Sarkozy in Last Push on Regulation,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20summit/6228132/Merkel-and-Sarkozy-in-last-push-on-regulation.html.
182. See Kabinett billigt schärfere Regeln für Managergehälter,
ALLGEMEINE
(March
11,
2009),
FRANKFURTER
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/gesetzentwurfkabinett-billigt-schaerfere-regeln-fuer-managergehaelter-1922930.html.
183. Björn Gaul & Alexandra Janz, Wahlkampgetöse im Aktienrecht: Gesetzliche Begrenzung der Vorstandsvergütung und Änderungen der Aufsichtsratstätigkeit, NZA 809 (2009).
184. ISS, Corporate Governance in Germany, GOVERNANCE EXCHANGE
WEBINAR
(Feb.
28,
2011,
9:30
AM),
http://www.issproxy.com/webcasts/CorporateGovernanceinGermany2011.
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tacks the compensation issue mainly by trying to make existing
control instruments and mechanisms, particularly the
Aufsichtsrat but also the shareholders, a more effective check
on the Vorstand. Using sustainability as its philosophical starting point,185 the VorstAG attempts to overhaul the perspective
from which the Aufsichtsrat, the organ responsible for negotiating Vorstand remuneration, approaches the remunerationsetting procedure for public companies.186 Under the VorstAG,
Vorstand compensation must be sustainable and must be appropriate with respect to Vorstand performance and should not
surpass the typical compensation awarded in the respective
industry without a special reason.187 In the event that the company’s financial position worsens significantly, the Aufsichtsrat
can exercise a clawback right, regardless of whether any exists
in the employment agreement or other contractual arrangements, which will reduce the compensation of current members
of the Vorstand as well as members of the Vorstand who have
left the company within the past three years. In keeping with
the trend of increasing the professionalization of the Aufsichtsrat to make it a more effective control on the Vorstand,188 compensation can be approved only by the entire Aufsichtsrat, as
opposed to simply a human resources committee, and the
members of the Aufsichtsrat are also personally liable in the
event that the compensation is deemed to be inappropriately
high. The Vorstand also faces a higher penalty for wrongdoing.
Should the company’s director & officer liability (“D&O”) insurance be triggered, the offending member of the Vorstand
must pay a deductible equal to 10% of the damages, but in no
event greater than 1.5 times his or her annual base salary. The
VorstAG seeks to heighten the Aufsichtsrat’s control by increasing the distance between the Vorstand and the Aufsichts-

185. Gaul & Janz, supra note 183.
186. The VorstAG’s applicability to only those companies traded on the
stock exchange is guaranteed by its incorporation into the Aktiengesetz, the
law which regulates share-based companies.
187. For a general explanation of the new VorstAG measures, the following
articles are very useful: Beck, Angemessenere Vorstandsgehälter: Bundestag
verabschiedet VorstAG, BECKLINK 283784; Dr. Holger Fleischer, Das Gesetz
zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), NZG 801 (2009). For
more on the development of the VorstAG, see Bearbeitungsstand des
VorstAGs, May 5, 2009 (on file with author).
188. Antrag der Abgeordneten Mechthid Dyckmans, supra note 173.
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rat through a mandatory two-year “cooling off” period before
the former member of the Vorstand can join the Aufsichtsrat.189
The shareholders are also given a non-binding say-on-pay vote
with respect to the Vorstand’s earnings, though at the company’s discretion.
2. Initial Reaction
Though the initial reactions to the VorstAG were varied, they
tended to be blasé or negative, albeit not necessarily overtly. It
was cynically noted that the entire law went from proposal to
fait accompli with unusual speed, pressed through before the
onset of the summer break while politicians were still out getting votes for reelection.190 These commentators implied it was
all a political stunt with no bite, and some seemed animated by
a feeling of a missed opportunity to achieve true reform. Others
felt the entire exercise was misguided. One commentator noted
that focusing on a multi-year performance measurement period
did nothing to hinder the spiraling executive bonuses that contribute to the destabilization of management pay.191 Another
attorney practicing in the field in Düsseldorf was surprised
that the VorstAG did not include changes to a company’s ability to fire its executives, noting that this threat was far more
effective in obtaining good behavior than clawbacks or extending performance review over multiple years.192 The law in189. Prior to the passage of the VorstAG, this kind of shift was fairly common, the argument being that the former member of the Vorstand was intimately acquainted with the business and could provide helpful information in
this regard. It is also helpful to remember that the Vorstand contains not
only CEO- and CFO-type positions, but can contain the Chief Technology
Officer or heads of important departments who could indeed offer advice from
his or her very specific area.
190. See Joachim Jahn, Das VorstAG: Neue Vorschriften gegen “unangemessene” Managerbezüge, GWR 283394 (2009); Jürgen van Kann & Anjela
Keiluweit, Das neue Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [The
New Law on the Appropriateness of Board Members’ Fees], 31 DEUTSCHES
STEUERRECHT [DSTR] 1587, 1587 (Ger.) (2009).
191. See Hermann J. Stern, One Page Commentary on the Unrecognized
Core Problem with Executive Pay Today, (June 12, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624223;
Pressemitteilungen, Fachnews, Anhörung: Experten im Rechtausschuss
streiten über Neurgelung der Managervergütung, BECKLINK 282389.
192. Hans-Hermann Aldenhoff, Abschaffung des Kündigungsschutzes für
Spitzdenverdiener, NZA 800 (2010).
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cludes no salary cap, as pointed out by the Green Party during
the proposal period, which in its view is a major flaw.193 Lawyers early on bemoaned a lack of precision—with key concepts,
like “sustainable compensation,” left undefined—making compliance difficult and, perhaps, even dangerous.194 Others were
less overtly negative, noting that many of the provisions already existed in the Corporate Governance Code and that the
law therefore had little practical and certainly no revolutionary
impact.195
But the reactions were not all bad, not least because the government had in fact shown extraordinary responsiveness in
acting quickly to try to do something about an issue that many
thought needed to be addressed.196 In defending her government’s law to the critics, Germany’s then-Minister of Justice,
Brigitte Zypries, went on the offensive, insisting that far from
being hastily cobbled together, the VorstAG had been drafted
by calm minds intent on doing what made sense rather than
caving to populist demands.197 The powers awarded to the
Aufsichtsrat were championed because, in the spirit of the
Code, they provided structure without limiting the flexibility
necessary to run a successful business, and the Aufsichtsrat
now had a greater arsenal of tools with which to combat a
rogue Vorstand.198 The law also resolved a key ambiguity. In
the Mannesmann era, the Aktiengesetz required only that compensation be reasonable, without defining what was reasonable. Under the VorstAG, however, the concept of reasonable
became more concrete, specifying that reasonable was to be de193. Antrag der Abgeordneten Chrintine Scheel, supra note 173.
194. Stellungnahme des Deutschen Anwaltvereins durch den Handelsrechtsausschuss zum Entworf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessentheit der
Vorstansvergütung (VorstAG), Stellungnahme nr. 32/2009, Apr. 2009,
http://anwaltverein.de/interessenvertretung/archiv-2009. Germany has no
agency rulemaking processes like those existing in the United States, with
the exception of the BaFin for banking law and capital market law, leaving
attorneys to interpret the law on its face themselves.
195. See, e.g., Kahn & Keiluweit, supra note 190, at 1587.
196. Jahn, supra note 190; Marcus Lutter, Stellungnahme im Rahme der
VorstAG,
May
20,
2009,
http://www.jura.uniduesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/rechtspolitik/; Ulrich Siebert, Das VorstAG –
Reglungen zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und zum
Aufsichtsrat, 32 WM 1489 (2009).
197. Siebert, supra note 196.
198. Id.
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fined on a peer group basis and then further defining how that
peer group basis should be set.199 The say-on-pay advisory vote
also had a positive reception.200 In place in England since 2002,
say-on-pay had been shown to have a positive, if not gamechanging, effect on executive compensation, punishing and
therefore ultimately minimizing so-called “pay for failure,” like
the kind highlighted by Disney in the United States.201
These were only the initial reactions, however, and by the
next year, the press and the government were focused on the
next corporate governance issue du jour, which was increasing
the percentage of women sitting on the male-dominated
Aufsichtsrats and Vorstands.202 The executive compensation
issue had relatively quickly disappeared from the headlines,
but the question remaining is, why? Had the corporations
learned? Had they changed? To assess this question, it is useful
to examine the primary material itself: the compensation disclosures made by the DAX 30, primarily in their annual reports.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Methodology
For an outsider, there is no better source of information for
executive compensation than a company’s annual report.203
Each annual report contains a section that describes the com-

199. Jahn, supra note 190.
200. Gunther Friedl et al., DSW-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2009,
DSW, http://www.dsw-info.de/DSW-Studie-zur-Vorstandsvergue.1576.0.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
201. See Ferre & Maber, supra note 82, at 1–4.
202. See Katrin Bennhold, Women Nudged Out of German Workforce, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/world/europe/29ihtFFgermany29.html?_r=1. The reaction has not necessarily been positive. See,
e.g., Nikolaus Doll & Olaf Gersemann, “Von der Leyens Frauenquote ist welt(Nov.
13,
2011),
fremd”,
DIE
WELT
http://www.welt.de/dieweltbewegen/article13714704/Von-der-LeyensFrauenquote-ist-weltfremd.html.
203. While a company may also issue press releases in response to compensation developments, that kind of disclosure remains rare in Germany. Of the
DAX 30 companies, for example, only a few issued a press release in connection with the VorstAG, which itself only served as a preview of coming attractions of sorts.
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pany’s general executive compensation policy as well as the
remuneration of the top executives.204 In the United States,
this section is referred to the CD&A, a term this Article will
use as shorthand to refer to both German and U.S. compensation disclosures. The CD&A not only reveals hard facts about
who was paid how much in a given year, but also offers an insight into how a company handles the very tricky issue of revealing just how much it paid its top officers. Disclosures vary,
of course. Some are helpful, with charts and clearly laid out
principles that allow the average stockholder to form a picture
of how exactly the company comes up with the sums its executives walk away with, while others present only a cursory explanation. Some group the information about compensation together, while others may force the reader to search through the
various footnotes to piece together a compensation picture that
is sketchy at best. Nevertheless, disclosures are generally helpful to ascertain changes over time. A company with the same
cookie-cutter disclosure year after year might not be as concerned with executive compensation as one that updates and
refines its presentation over time. The development of a company’s CD&A over time also shows how it reacts to a new law
or requirement. This is especially true for the VorstAG—what
better way to show good faith and compliance with an issue of
great importance to shareholders than to lay related compliance mechanisms bare in the annual report?
To properly assess the impact of the VorstAG, it is illuminating to examine annual reports from 2008, 2009, and 2010. Because there were no other executive compensation-related rules
passed during this time, it is fair to assume that any changes
made to the CD&A were the result of the VorstAG requirements or the indirect result of companies having their compensation reports come under new scrutiny. The 2008 reports
should serve as a control group for pre-VorstAG compensation
204. In the United States, this requirement stems from the SEC’s CD&A
requirements, which many law firms lay out very helpfully for their clients in
order to enable them to comply. See, e.g., Memorandum, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, SEC Adopts Changes to Compensation Disclosure
Rules
(Dec.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/1093957/22dec09erisa.pdf. For a good description of the requirements in Germany, as well as whether they were triggered by European initiatives, see Simon Leuring, Offene Fragen zur Offenlgung der Vorstandsvergütung, NZG 945 (2005).
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structure and disclosure; the 2009 reports should chronicle the
beginnings of the implementation of various VorstAG provisions; and the 2010 reports should reflect a complete picture of
compensation strategy following the full effectiveness of the
VorstAG. In particular, the analysis in this Article is centered
on the reports of the DAX 30, the premier stock index in Germany composed of blue chip companies traded on the Frankfurt
stock exchange, including the likes of Deutsche Bank, Siemens,
BMW, and Lufthansa.205 Since, as public companies, the DAX
30 were all affected by the VorstAG, this group includes the
companies that were most visible and thus had the most to lose
by not complying with the VorstAG.
I reviewed these annual reports on two levels: qualitative and
quantitative. On the qualitative level, my goal was to determine whether the VorstAG had caused a shift in the companies’ executive compensation strategies or the manner in which
they were disclosed. With regard to strategies, as further described below, I assessed the extent to which the annual reports discussed the VorstAG itself and whether they had included VorstAG concepts in the CD&A. If they had been included, was it purely on a cosmetic level, adding a few
buzzwords here and there, or had companies seriously revamped their compensation systems to try to comply with the
new law? With regard to the manner of disclosure, I looked to
benchmarks like how long the CD&A section became and
whether descriptions became clearer or the section differently
organized. On the quantitative level, I looked at how Vorstand
compensation was apportioned. In other words, what percentage of compensation was paid out as base salary, as bonus, etc.,
and how did those percentages change from year to year? I calculated the percentages by dividing the amount paid to the entire Vorstand in any given category—such as salary, benefits,
or long-term incentive compensation—by the total compensation they were all paid. In the few cases where the company did
not provide an overall compensation amount, I totaled the
numbers from the various categories to arrive at this
205. As of March 2011, the full DAX 30 consisted of the following companies: Adidas, Allianz, BASF, Bayer, Beiersdorf, BMW Commerzbank, Daimler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Börse, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom,
E.ON, Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius SE, HeidelbergCement, Henkel,
Infineon, K+S, Linde, Lufthansa, MAN, Merck, Metro, Munich Re, RWE,
SAP, Siemens, ThyssenKrupp, and Volkswagen.
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amount.206 I tried to remain as true as possible to the categorizations chosen by the company, which tended to fall into the
following: salary, benefits (together with salary, “fixed compensation”), bonus or short-term incentive pay, long-term incentive
pay, and occasionally medium-term incentive pay. I did not
question any individual company’s assignation of values, nor
did I try to evaluate whether programs were correctly labeled
as long-, medium-, or short-term. I also tried to control potential distortions, omitting cases of non-reporting from my averages. I did, however, include compensation numbers where a
company decided not to make a certain payment or executives
decided to forgo it in a particular year, because this is as much
a part of compensation strategy as making a payment. In short,
I tried to put myself in the place of the informed shareholder
looking to cast my vote on remuneration at any one of these
given companies. Several questions were key: In what direction
was the remuneration going? Were there any perceptible direct
changes that resulted from the VorstAG? Would the reader of
the annual reports be sufficiently or at least better informed as
a result of the changes?
B. Substantive (Qualitative) Changes
The 2010 compensation discussion sections were very different from their 2008 predecessors, with disclosure that was both
better than and different from the typical level in 2008. What is
especially interesting about the VorstAG is that its provisions
contain both very precise requirements—for example, requiring
a deductible for D&O insurance policies—as well as more general requirements—for example, that compensation policies be
“sustainable.” Thus companies had to show in their disclosure
sections that they were complying not only with specific rules,
but also with more general principles.
Companies were clearly eager to show they had complied
with the letter of the law by including specific references to the
VorstAG. Over 70%207 of the companies in either or both of

206. The companies and years in question were Deutsche Bank in 2007 and
2008, and Deutsche Post in 2008, 2009, and 2010. I note that while Deutsche
Bank started reporting aggregate numbers in 2009, Deutsche Post provided
no compensation numbers at all for 2007 in the 2008 Annual Report.
207. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percentage, generally speaking, unless otherwise indicated.
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their 2009 and 2010 compensation discussions included a discussion of the VorstAG, including Allianz, BASF, and Daimler,
which each issued a specific, separate press release acknowledging the VorstAG and the compensation structure decisions
being made with respect to it. Over 70% of the companies explicitly framed their compensation in “sustainable” terms or
described the spirit of their compensation structure in words
that, if not directly lifted from the VorstAG itself, very clearly
reflected the philosophy of the new law, emphasizing sustainability and appropriateness. Companies in the former category
included Metro and RWE, which respectively noted in 2009, for
the first time, that “[t]he remuneration structure is geared towards sustainable corporate growth,”208 and “the compensation
structure will be brought more in line with sustainable business development.”209 Those whose disclosures reflected the
spirit of the VorstAG tended to include statements, such as
that made by Deutsche Post, that the “remuneration of the
Board of Management for 2009 is in line with standard market
practice, appropriate to the tasks involved and designed to reward performance; it comprises fixed and variable elements as
well as long-term incentives,”210 or otherwise made clear that
the company was calculating risk in order to create a compensation package that was appropriate and rewarded (only) good
business results.211
90 percent of the DAX 30 companies thoroughly reexamined
and, in many cases, completely overhauled their compensation
schemes, according to their annual reports. Of this 90%, 85%
stated that their re-evaluation came as a direct result of the
VorstAG (including, among others, Commerzbank, BMW, E.ON
and HeidelbergCement). Given the lack of other executive compensation regulations during this time, it is safe to assume that
even those companies who did not explicitly mention the
VorstAG as the driving force behind their compensation restructuring were reacting to the VorstAG as well. A significant
portion of the companies—over 36%—indicated that they hired
a compensation consultant to review their pay structures and
ensure they complied with the new law. More impressive, how-

208.
209.
210.
211.

METRO, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 103 (2010).
RWE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 124 (2010).
DHL, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 114 (2010).
See DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 43, 213 (2010).
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ever, is the growth of this figure. While only one company mentioned having engaged a compensation consultant in 2008,
eleven companies indicated in 2010 that they had hired a compensation consultant. This is an interesting contrast with the
number of companies that mentioned the use of vertical and
horizontal peer grouping,212 directly or indirectly, which went
up much less—up to twenty-two companies in 2010 from sixteen in 2008, an increase of less than 40%.213 Interestingly,
firms generally did not explicitly state in their CD&A whether
they implemented a new D&O deductible payment policy. Instead their compliance or lack thereof was indicated through a
different section, that of the degree to which they complied
with the Code. Some changes, on the other hand, were almost
universal. Before the VorstAG, nearly all of the companies had
compensation committees that made all decisions regarding
compensation. After the VorstAG, these committees continued
but only in an advisory role.
While new compensation disclosures indeed reflected the specific requirements set forth in the VorstAG, it is far more interesting to see how they reflected the general principles, which, it
turns out, clearly heightened the quality of the disclosure.214
The disclosures were clearer and more descriptive, enabling the
intelligent reader to form an idea of how the companies’ compensation setting and payment processes work, including what
components are considered, and how and why the compensation packages are structured as they are.
This increase in disclosure is reflected in the increase in page
numbers, beginning in 2009. For instance, SAP increased the
212. Horizontal peer grouping compares salaries of executives at a particular company to those at a company deemed similar in terms of size and industry, while vertical peer grouping looks at the differences in salary internally at different levels of the company, comparing the amount earned by
management, for example, to the amount earned by managers.
213. Both the hiring of external consultants and peer grouping are means
by which a company will “legitimize” their compensation policy; the implication is that it has been “blessed” either by a compensation professional, whose
job it is to know the compensation market, or by direct comparison to the
market itself. U.S. CD&As tend to use both. That more companies, both as a
percentage and a hard number, opted for one of these methods of legitimization over the other, is interesting.
214. Better here in the sense that poor disclosure renders the information
opaque and is of little use to the average investor, the target audience of
these disclosures.
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compensation-related section of its disclosure from sixteen pages in 2008, to eighteen in 2009, to twenty in 2010;215 Munich Re
from nine in 2008, to seventeen in 2009 and 2010;216 and
Deutsche Börse from seven in 2008, to ten in 2009, to twelve in
2010.217 That this increase in page numbers is due to the general requirements of the VorstAG and not the actual description of VorstAG-related programs is indicated by the fact that
already in 2009, before many companies had implemented specific policies targeted to respond to the VorstAG, many companies surveyed had longer compensation disclosure sections to
try to provide more insight into their existing programs and
comply with the spirit of transparency of the VorstAG. Over
75% of the companies had increased the length of their compensation report by 2010 as compared with 2008.
Compensation discussions were also easier to find. Of the
companies that had split up their compensation information,
relegating the actual amounts paid to the footnotes, 50% opted
to form a more cohesive section, moving their compensation
numbers into the same section as their compensation philosophy description. Deutsche Bank even went so far as to create a
separate compensation booklet to give the shareholder a better
understanding of their structures, obviating the need to go to
the trouble of pinning down the information in the annual report.218 In addition, the two companies that prior to the Vorst
AG had refused to disclose certain compensation information,
changed their decisions to withhold that information in 2010.
As discussed in detail below, only one company, HeidelbergCement had voted not to describe its compensation philosophy or reveal anything beyond aggregate numbers. In 2010,
however, HeidelbergCement’s annual report included a compensation disclosure section whose detail and length made
215. SAP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 40–55 (2009); SAP, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT
36–53 (2010); SAP 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 40–59 (2011).
216. MUNICH RE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 44-52 (2009); MUNICH RE, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 56-72 (2010); MUNICH RE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 50-66 (2011).
217. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 66–72 (2009); DEUTSCHE
BÖRSE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 43–52 (2010); DEUTSCHE BÖRSE, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 58–69 (2011).
218. As a bank, Deutsche Bank is subject to additional compensation rules
as of July 27, 2010 under the Gesetz über die aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an die Vergütungssysteme von Instituten und Versicherungsunternehmen. Hence, their updated compensation disclosure may not be the result of
the VorstAG alone.
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clear that they had no intent to hide the ball. The other company, Merck, had refused to disclose nearly all compensation information, stating that its corporate structure necessitated that
such information could be disclosed only by the company’s general partner. Like HeidelbergCement, though, Merck changed
its tune in 2010, publishing information that it had hitherto
deemed unnecessary to disclose in its annual report. Furthermore, companies became more forward-looking in their disclosures, offering a preview of coming attractions in compensation
changes. In 2008, 7% had this feature, compared with 63% in
2009, and back down slightly, though still up overall, to 43% in
2010.
Not only did compensation disclosures increase in their number of pages and become easier to find, but the descriptions also
changed from year to year in a way that indicated that companies were rethinking their compensation structures, or at the
very least, rethinking the disclosure of their compensation
structures, by avoiding boilerplate copies of the same information. Indeed over 40% added more graphics and 66% added
additional sections. The one section that showed a clear tendency to remain exactly the same year after year was the severance section. 60 percent of companies kept their severance
sections essentially or exactly the same, with their usual boilerplate language (sometimes featuring superficial alterations),
and in general this language was far less informative than the
remainder of the compensation disclosure section. This may
reflect the fact that, of all the portions of compensation disclosure, severance was the least affected by the VorstAG in the
time period examined, as the VorstAG did not apply to existing
compensation contracts, but only to those entered into after the
law became effective.219 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note
that sixteen companies—over half of the DAX 30—indicated
they had begun to amend existing agreements, in whole or in
part, to comply with the provisions of the VorstAG or the new
compensation system developed under the VorstAG, despite
the “out” the law had given them. At Deutsche Telekom, where
the option to update was voluntary, seven out of nine executives agreed to have their contracts amended. Since this
219. It is worth noting that most German executives do not have at-will
contracts as in the United States, so the law anticipated contracts needing to
be re-signed in, at most, a few years that would reflect all of its provisions.
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amendment generally cannot be done unilaterally and requires
the consent of the executive in question, it makes sense that
most of the companies that amended their executives’ existing
contracts also showed improvement in their disclosures, be it a
marked improvement like RWE’s, or even a modest improvement to an already highly informative disclosure regime, like
Siemens’. Companies also implemented clawbacks in their performance payments. Many had classical clawbacks for poor behavior, although there was an increasing number of performance-based clawbacks, under which payments were to be
awarded only in the event that certain benchmarks going forward were reached.
The biggest qualitative change in the DAX 30’s compensation
disclosures, however, was the quality and the scale of their
elaboration. 77 percent of companies more completely disclosed
performance related practices, and 67% discussed percentage
targets necessary to earn certain amounts of money. Indeed, in
their 2010 disclosures, an astounding 86% of companies elaborated more fully how their compensation structures functioned
in real time.
The best example to show the depth and breadth of the compensation changes is to look at how one particular company,
HeidelbergCement, changed its compensation disclosure from
2008 to 2010. HeidelbergCement perhaps showed the greatest
improvement in its compensation disclosure following the implementation of the VorstAG. In sum, whereas in 2008, HeidelbergCement provided only a few pro forma paragraphs that
were, truthfully, of little interest or help to the average shareholder, in 2010, it not only described its new compensation
structure in great detail, but it also did so in a way that was
helpful and readily accessible to the average shareholder.
In 2008, HeidelbergCement’s annual report was one of the
worst among the DAX 30, for both its paucity of information
and highly superficial discussion of remuneration. It devotes
less than a page to Vorstand remuneration, of which half described the compensation strategy in very generalized terms.
The variable component of compensation, for example, was described as “depend[ing] on the achievement of specific financial
goals set by the Personnel Committee of the Supervisory Board
at the beginning of the financial year (target net profit).”220 The
220. HEIDELBERGCEMENT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2009).
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company announced aggregate compensation numbers for the
Vorstand in paragraph form, far more difficult to read than in
chart form, and stated merely amounts paid for fixed and variable remuneration and perks. Since it did not disclose amounts
paid as bonus, nor provide any further detail on payment structure to determine, for example, which sum included the bonus,
the numbers had little to no value. The 2008 report also noted
that “the 2006 Annual General Meeting exercised their right to
exempt the Company from the obligation to publish the remuneration of each individual member of the Managing Board,”
without even giving a basis for why they had decided to seek
shareholder approval to avoid this disclosure, as required under the VorstOG.221 In short, the annual report gave the average shareholder virtually no concept of how compensation was
actually earned or the benchmarks upon which it depended, let
alone the actual amounts individuals were earning.
The 2009 annual report began to show signs of improvement.
Remuneration was detailed in a “remuneration report” just
over a page long, and compensation was described as not only
taking into account compensation at peer companies deemed
comparable via the peer grouping process, but also set with an
eye to internal company pay structure, thus making horizontal
as well as vertical comparisons.222 The company also added a
sentence, clearly influenced by the VorstAG, to emphasize that
“[t]he remuneration structure is fundamentally already geared,
and independent of future developments, towards the sustainable development of the Group.”223 While not brimming with
detail, HeidelbergCement’s 2009 annual report marked a clear
effort to better describe the various portions of the company’s
compensation package. For example, shareholders learned for
the first time that the company paid two types of bonuses. The
first, a regular variable bonus, “depends on the achievement of
specific financial goals set by the plenary session of the Supervisory Board [Aufsichtsrat] at the beginning of the financial
year (Group share of profit after taxes and minorities).”224
Thus, not only was the term “target net profit” from the 2008
Annual Report further elaborated as “(Group share of profit
221. Id. at 34.
222. See HEIDELBERGCEMENT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2010) [hereinafter
HEIDELBERG CEMENT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT].
223. Id.
224. Id.
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after taxes)”, but the new structure of decision-making mandated by the VorstAG was also reflected, with the Aufsichtsrat
rather than an HR committee setting financial goals that needed to be met for a payout to the Vorstand to occur. The second
bonus was a medium-term bonus paid in 2009 and 2008.225 The
2009 report further noted that additional compensation
measures were being tied to the firm’s successful refinancing,
i.e., to the ongoing health of the firm.226 This feature is a crowdpleaser because it aligns payments with VorstAG principles
and shows shareholders that executives are not simply rewarded at the expense of the company, as the company will only
make payments if financing is successful.
While still in paragraph form and boasting no individual remuneration amounts, the section describing how much compensation the company paid also improved. Instead of merely
listing the amounts paid out in 2009 and 2008, the report describes whether they rose or sank and why. There was also a
paragraph indicating that “[i]t is intended to review the remuneration system for the members of the Managing Board [the
Vorstand] in the second half of 2010, especially regarding
changes to regulatory provisions, and to develop it further if
necessary. Experiences of other German companies with multinational exposure will be taken into consideration.”227 Though
the company does not credit the VorstAG by name for the review, the motivation is clear.
It is in 2010, however, that a sea change comes to HeidelbergCement’s compensation disclosure; indeed, the section is
unrecognizable. The 2010 remuneration report was elevated to
the status of a proper section and ran nine pages long.228 Remuneration of the Managing Board, which used to be the only
subsection, was further subdivided into 2010 versus 2011 remuneration.229 Though the 2010 remuneration section, in substance, is very similar to the 2009 section, its subdivision into
“principles,” “remuneration elements,” and “amount of remuneration” allows the average shareholder to parse better the
information he is receiving.230 The remuneration section for
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 44.
HEIDELBERGCEMENT, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 128–36 (2011).
Id. at 128–29.
Id.
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2011 on, however, is not only better organized, but displays a
remarkably high level of detail on compensation components
and structures. The section begins with an entire subsection
discussing how the company intends to implement the
VorstAG, which includes the following:
[H]igher weighting of variable remuneration compared with
fixed remuneration, higher weighting of long-term bonus with
a multi-year assessment base compared with the annual bonus, linking of long-term bonus with the various key financial
ratios as well as the relative development of the HeidelbergCement share compared with the DAX 30 Index and the
MSCI World Construction Materials Index and the absolute
development of the HeidelbergCement share; [and the] obligation for all members of the Managing Board to maintain a
fixed number of HeidelbergCement shares as an individual
investment.231

This description—only a part of the 2010 report—is far more
detailed than anything previously published by the company
and demonstrates a clear commitment to the principles of the
VorstAG. The company noted that the new system was developed in accordance with a renowned remuneration expert and
that the compensation system “[was] geared even more than
before towards the sustainable development of the Group,”232
an impressive change from two years before, when there was
no mention of sustainability whatsoever. The company then
devoted four complete pages to outlining the components of its
new compensation system (i.e., fixed annual salary, variable
annual bonus, variable long-term bonus with long-term incentive, fringe benefits, and pension promises).233 Further, the
company provided a graph showing how the various compensation components stacked up against one another and a pie
chart showing the proportion of fixed to variable compensation.
It also described the contents of the pie charts in words, giving
the average shareholder multiple ways in which to visualize
and understand which portion of compensation is paid out in
what form.234 In addition, the company broke down each of the
compensation components, showing exactly how each would be
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 130–33.
Id. at 130.
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calculated. The annual bonus, the disclosure explains, is a
combination of the target value, key performance indicators
(which in turn rely on both company-wide and individual targets), and the target achievement range. A sample calculation
was even provided to show how the tabulations play out.235 The
company went through the same exercise for the long-term bonus.236 Finally, the company decided to forego its shareholdergranted privilege of disclosing only aggregate, as opposed to
individual, compensation figures. HeidelbergCement made
clear that individual disclosure was part of its new compensation system and even disclosed the individualized figures for
2011.237 It also interestingly noted that the Supervisory Board
“still ha[d]” the option to adjust the variable remuneration elements by plus or minus 25% in accordance with “the personal
performance of the individual members of the Managing Board
and/or for exceptional circumstances.”238 Although it is unclear
from this wording whether this was a power the Supervisory
Board had always wielded, the answer is to some degree irrelevant for the shareholder who never even knew it existed until
after the VorstAG.
Not all compensation reports changed as much as HeidelbergCement’s in the wake of the VorstAG, but then again, most
of them started out with slightly better disclosure in the first
place. Regardless, the elements of change evident in the annual
reports of HeidelbergCement from 2008 to 2010 were present
in other DAX 30 reports from the same time period. The reports reveal a new, clear standard and a new, clear winner: the
shareholder, who is now in a far better position to make a
judgment as to the health of the compensation practice—and,
arguably, the corporate governance culture itself—than he was
in 2007.
C. Quantitative Changes
While many quantitative changes in compensation were evident from the annual reports examined, in many ways it was
simply too early to discern their significance. Given the market

235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 134.
Id.
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fluctuations since 2007,239 stock-based compensation that companies had originally designed to award might have turned out
to have a great deal less value by year’s end. In addition, in
light of the financial crisis, executives at certain companies,
particularly banks, agreed to forego portions of their compensation packages, such as bonuses or other variable compensation.240 Lastly, the numbers alone could not tell the whole
truth, as the payout of some of the awarded compensation disclosed might have been contingent upon future performance
and subject to being clawed back. This would mean that certain
variable pay components might appear higher than they were
in reality.
Despite the above disclaimers, certain trends seemed to
emerge that are worth mentioning. As with the qualitative
changes, there was a tendency to disclose more information.
For example, HeidelbergCement, as discussed above, had previously taken a vote allowing it to bypass the VorstAG’s requirement to disclose board members’ compensation, but chose
to forego this privilege going forward; Volkswagen, for the first
time, in 2009, explicitly identified its “variable” payment as a
short-term bonus payment;241 and Merck, also as previously
mentioned, disclosed the individual earnings of its executives
in 2010 rather than using a technicality allowing them to be
disclosed in a separate report as they had in both 2008 and

239. Because Annual Reports typically list salary for the year of the report
and the year prior, I was able to analyze salary percentages from 2007 to
2010.
240. Typically, an executive’s compensation is made up of three components: base salary (fixed compensation); short-, medium-, and long-term incentive pay (variable compensation); and perks. The annual bonus is an example of short-term variable pay. Variable compensation tends to be paid out
under a written compensation plan that the company will have in place for
the executives only. Subject to the company and/or the executive meeting
certain milestones, a certain amount of pay is awarded, and a certain amount
vests, that is to say, belongs to the executive. Vesting can be used as an incentive over time. In other words, to keep an executive in a certain position
longer, you might have his incentive pay vest only after four years at the
company. Other provisos can also be added. For example, an executive may
be required to forfeit certain payments if the company’s financial goals are
not met. Provisions that mandate a return of money already paid to the executive in this way are called “clawbacks”.
241. VOLKSWAGEN, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 102–05 (2009); VOLKSWAGEN, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 113 (2010).
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2009.242 Furthermore, adding a medium-term compensation
component seemed to be increasingly appealing in the wake of
the VorstAG. While in 2007 only three of the thirty DAX companies included a medium-term variable compensation component in their disclosures, the number more than doubled, totaling seven, in the 2010 reports.243
Trends were also evident in the structural breakdown of executives’ compensation—that is, in the percentages of their total pay coming from bonuses versus base salaries, etc.244 Generally, the 2010 Vorstand received a greater proportion of its
salary in the form of base salary and long-term variable pay,
and a lesser proportion in bonuses and perks, than the 2007
Vorstand.245 More specifically, base salary accounted for 24% of
the Vorstand’s salary on average in 2007, 31% in 2008, 35% in
2009, and 30% in 2010. The peak in 2009 might be due to the
fact that the shares granted as variable compensation that year
were subject to significant market volatility and were worth
less than anticipated at the time the grants were determined.
Despite the decreased value of the shares, the Aufsichtsrat was
unwilling to compensate the executives by awarding more
shares to make up the difference in value, thereby artificially
inflating the salary to be a greater percentage of total compensation. But even setting aside 2009, that companies reallocated
7% of total pay to base salary in 2010 as compared with 2007
remains a significant phenomenon. Total fixed income, on average, also rose significantly, from 28% in 2007 to 39% in 2009,
although it declined to 32% in 2010.246 Long-term variable
242. Compare MERCK, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (2009), and MERCK, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 84 (2010), with MERCK, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 111–13 (2011)
[hereinafter MERCK, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT].
243. The three companies from 2007 were Allianz, Fresenius Medical Care,
and Siemens. In 2010, Allianz, Fresenius Medical, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche
Post, RWE, SAP, and ThyssenKrupp had compensation structures explicitly
featuring medium-term variable components.
244. I note that here I used the total amount of compensation paid out to
the Vorstand. In other words, I did not calculate the numbers for each individual, but rather used the aggregates provided by the company, unless otherwise indicated. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
245. Although I was only looking at annual reports from 2008 to 2010, each
annual report lists the compensation information from the prior year as well.
Thus, I was able to compare salary information from 2007 through 2010.
246. Since different companies reported different types of compensation, the
average percentages do not line up because they are averages of a different
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compensation247 generally also rose steadily, from 26% in 2007
and 2008, to 27% in 2009, and 29% in 2010. This means that
long-term variable pay plus base salary now equal approximately 60% of the pay of a member of the Vorstand, up from
just under 50% in 2007. These changes are perfectly in line
with the VorstAG’s emphasis on sustainable pay.
Perks, meanwhile, fell from their 2007 level of nearly 5% by
about 2 percentage points, despite a sharp increase in 2008 to
roughly 7%. This overall trend, however, is logical—perks are
never popular with shareholders and can be particularly bad
for the image of a company. The other percentage clearly on the
decline was the bonus. While companies paid the Vorstand, on
average, nearly 51% of their income as a bonus in 2007, it declined to 47% in 2008, and 40% in 2009, before increasing again
slightly to 43% in 2010. This overall decrease is in line with the
VorstAG, which targeted a move away from short-term variable compensation—in other words, the bonus. The trajectory of
bonus payments as a percentage of overall income should prove
interesting and vital to future assessment of the VorstAG as a
reform.
One might argue that averages hide the picture, but a look at
the numbers for individual companies confirms the trends
identified above. Over half of the companies decreased their
bonus percentages, but maintained or increased fixed salary
percentages, in 2010 as compared with 2007. Similarly, over
half of the companies that reported the information awarded a
greater percentage of salary as long-term compensation. Still,
there was a remarkable variety in the numbers, even within
similar industries. In the auto industry, for example, BMW offered no medium- or long-term variable compensation on the
view that it was not helpful in motivating executives. Thus,
BMW paid 20% of compensation as fixed salary in 2010 (compared with 17% in 2007) and 80% in the form of a bonus (down
from 82% in 2007). Daimler, on the other hand, while still
awarding over half of income in the form of a bonus in 2010 (a
figure up slightly from 2007’s 49%), had a robust long-term performance program, which accounted for 29% of the Vorstand’s
number of companies. Volkswagen, for example, reported total fixed salary,
but did not report how much was paid as a base salary and how much as
perks.
247. This includes both long-term compensation and, for those companies
who have it, medium-term compensation.
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income in 2010 (interestingly, down slightly from 2007’s figure
of 31%). The comparison with Volkswagen was perhaps too early to draw from these reports—it restructured its compensation
in the period examined and also chose not to award bonuses in
2007. Bearing that in mind, Volkswagen changed from a 38/62
fixed income to performance income structure in 2007, to a
30/70 fixed income to bonus structure in 2008 and 2009, to essentially 20/50/30 fixed income to bonus to long-term incentive
structure for 2010 and beyond. As these extreme differences
highlight, even within market competitors, drawing significant
conclusions from changes in percentages beyond that of general
trends would seem premature.
Given that the eternal complaint of executive compensation
critics is that sums are too high, the pink elephant in the room
is, of course, whether the VorstAG impacted the actual raw
numbers paid out as salary. Again, the results were mixed.
Overall pay rose by a maximum of 77% at Lufthansa and
dropped by a maximum of nearly 60% at Commerzbank from
2007 to 2010. For that same time period, of the twenty-five
companies that reported salary information for both years, 40%
saw an overall increase and 60% saw an overall decrease. Here
the general economic situation is of little help: Germany remained, for the most part, economically stable throughout this
period.248
IV. EVALUATION
The VorstAG had lofty goals, but was it able to achieve what
it set out to do? This section addresses that question on three
fronts: first, by evaluating the changes in the annual reports
against the law’s own goals; second, by checking whether people’s predictions of the impact of the law proved to be accurate;
and third, by asking whether the law brought about a new era
in which executive compensation is both better structured, with
an eye to the long term, and more transparent.

248. For one of many articles on the continuous stability of the Germany
economy, even in the face of the recent global recession and ongoing Eurozone
turmoil, see Richard Anderson, German Economic Strength: The Secrets of
Success, BBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business18868704.
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A. The VorstAG Measured Against Itself
The goals of the VorstAG, broadly put, were three-fold: (1) to
increase transparency, (2) to make compensation structure
more sustainable, and (3) to emphasize the long-term view in
structuring compensation.
First, with regard to increasing executive compensation
transparency, the VorstAG has more than reached its goals. As
discussed in Part III above, the VorstAG has had a clear and
significant impact. Not only are compensation discussions
longer, they are clearer and offer a more in-depth description of
how performance factors work, as well as how the ultimate
payouts are calculated. Even companies that started out with
relatively informative disclosure practices, like Siemens in
2008, produced a 2010 report that was significantly clearer and
explained in-depth what the new changes were, why the company had decided to make the changes, and what precisely it
was about the changes that made the new system preferable,
placing more of an emphasis on the long-term. K+S, whose
2008 disclosure was already above average for its informative
nature, updated its disclosure to provide a sample calculation
of how compensation would be paid out under the new structures. Given that one of the problems with disclosure is that it
tends to overwhelm the reader, breaking out a sample calculation allows the reader to visualize exactly what the descriptions
and performance metrics mean in terms of the cash that the
executive actually takes home.
It is true that transparent disclosure is far from reigning supreme. Approximately 13% of the DAX 30 saw no increase in
elaboration between 2008 and 2010. One company, Man, even
had worse disclosure in its 2010 annual report than in 2008,
providing a less complete picture of compensation and removing some compensation summaries in tabular form that had
proven useful in years prior. But even some of the most reticent
companies displayed signs of an awareness that they were living in a world where new compensation disclosure norms were
required. Merck, for example, after offering no disclosure in
2008 or 2009 on the grounds that it could be done in a different
company’s annual report, making it more difficult for shareholders to find, included a limited amount of disclosure in 2010.
Its amount of compensation disclosure, however, was less interesting than the pains it took to justify the lack of disclosure.
In its 2010 report, Merck went into far more detail than it did
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in years prior to describe what precisely it was about its corporate structure that entitled the company to bypass the disclosure rules required by the VorstOG before offering up limited
compensation disclosure for the first time. It further went to
great lengths to emphasize that all of the disclosure was voluntary.249 HeidelbergCement, on the other hand, after years of
non-disclosure by virtue of a shareholder vote permitting that
approach, simply threw in the towel, coming out in 2010 with
some of the clearest and best disclosures in the DAX 30. Clearly, the VorstAG imposed expectations of a new level of transparency, and those who do not comply might worry about reprisals from the market, their shareholders, or both, if they fall
below these new VorstAG-inspired norms.
In the second category, sustainability,250 the review was more
mixed, and more time is likely needed for a full assessment.
From a substantive perspective, the focus on sustainability was
clear. Almost 75% of the DAX 30 either referenced sustainability as a new guiding principle for compensation in the wake of
the VorstAG, or discussed their updated compensation plans in
the sustainable terms that the VorstAG set out, or both.251 But
the numbers do not necessarily support the idea that sustainable compensation structures are here to stay. The single largest
piece of evidence for this concern is the continued prominence
of the most vilified and unsustainable portion of compensation—the annual bonus. Based on achieving short-term incentives in the year in question, the annual bonus, one could argue, does nothing to encourage sustainable growth, particularly
when it forms such an important portion of the compensation
package.
And indeed, annual bonuses clearly still do constitute a major
portion of executive compensation. In 2010, bonuses, for the
companies that reported them (and not including those companies where executives chose to forego them), still accounted on
average for 43% of compensation paid to the Vorstand. While
249. MERCK, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 111.
250. Sustainability here as elsewhere refers generally to the stakeholder
concept. The company has to be run such that it continues to be a going concern for the benefit of all those who have a stake in its operations, from employees to shareholders to business partners, rather than maximizing one
aspect of the company at the expense of another. The details of how a compensation plan is to be made “sustainable” is left to individual companies.
251. See supra notes 208–211 and accompanying text.
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the figure was down from nearly 51% in 2007, it still accounted
for the single largest factor in the Vorstand’s compensation
packages.252 The bonus percentages for individual Vorstands do
vary, of course: in 2010, five companies awarded less than 30%
of total compensation as bonuses, eight awarded between 30%
and 39%, six between 40% and 49%, six between 50% and 59%,
three between 60% and 69%, and one over 70%. It is hard to
see how a compensation structure meets the VorstAG’s goal of
sustainability when it consists in such large part of annual bonuses—for example, when the members of the Vorstand, such
as that at Henkel, earns 69% of their income in bonus form, 6%
as long-term performance variable compensation, and 25% as
base salary. When any one person earns such a significant portion of his or her pay as a reward for short-term decisions that
look no further than the end of next quarter, it quickly becomes
clear why and how these structures could have contributed to
the financial crisis and remain a hindrance to sustainable
growth. Thankfully, however, the picture once again is not so
bleak. For every Henkel in the DAX 30, there are also companies like SAP, which have more than halved the percentage of
compensation that gets paid as a bonus, down to 34% from
about 71% in 2007. It is also interesting to note that there is no
necessary correlation between companies that display spectacularly improved disclosure that hews closely to the VorstAG’s
principles and the percentage of compensation paid as a bonus.
SAP, for example, while showing improved disclosure, came
nowhere near the helpfulness of Deutsche Bank’s disclosure.
However, companies that continued to pay a significant percentage out as a bonus often sharply increased the quality of
their disclosure, perhaps seeking to justify this high proportion
through the additional information.
With respect to the VorstAG goal of fostering more attention
in compensation structures to the longer term, again the results were mixed, in part because of changing compensation
systems and in part because of stock market fluctuations. It is
true that the portion of compensation paid out as long-term incentive pay is increasing, and the number of companies offering

252. I should note here that Commerzbank has not paid a bonus to its
Vorstand since 2007. In 2008, neither Deutsche Bank nor Deutsche Post paid
any bonus, and in 2009, Mann SE and ThyssenKrupp elected not to pay bonuses.
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medium-term compensation has doubled. However, so few
companies were using medium-term compensation as part of
their plans in 2007 that doubling this number still leads to a
rather unimpressive figure—less than 25% of the DAX 30 were
using medium-term compensation programs as of 2010. In addition, the bonus issues discussed above remain problematic.
The amounts being paid out as long-term compensation for the
most part pale in comparison to what is being paid out as bonuses.253
B. Evaluating Initial Reactions
As discussed in Part II, many people made a variety of predictions about the VorstAG and its ultimate impact. On the one
hand, those who reacted negatively believed the law would be
more or less useless—they predicted that it would not have any
kind of real impact nor would it stop executive compensation
from spiraling increasingly out of control. On the other hand,
those who saw the VorstAG positively believed that it would
better allow the Aufsichtsrat to control the Vorstand. Two especially positive features were thought to be defining the peer
group and adding say-on-pay to help lessen instances of “pay
for failure,” those highly publicized incidents such as Disney,
where disgraced executives receive monumental sums as they
leave the company.
The critics were at least partially wrong. As discussed in Part
IV.A, the VorstAG did have a significant impact, both on compensation disclosure and, as far as can be ascertained from the
earlier description, on compensation structure as well. The increased disclosure, the in-depth descriptions, the hiring of
compensation consultants, and the inclusion of additional
charts and graphs are all a result of the VorstAG, as are the
reevaluations of compensation structure. As for the question of
whether the VorstAG will provide any kind of pushback
against the spiraling salaries that receive such significant media attention, the annual reports examined are inconclusive,

253. The significant exceptions are Commerzbank (paying no bonus), Infineon (paying significantly more as long-term compensation than as bonus),
and Deutsche Bank and Fresnius (essentially paying an equal percentage of
both long-term compensation and bonus). Here, the new compensation regulations for financial institutions may be at play, revealing an even larger
problem.
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and it might be too early to tell. While some companies did see
salary increases as compared with 2007, of the twenty-five
DAX 30 that actually reported compensation in both 2007 and
2010, 60% reported an overall decrease, by anywhere between
4% and 60%. Again, the remaining salaries rose, and some very
steeply, during this time—Lufthansa’s compensation increased
the most drastically, by 77%. Causation is particularly tricky to
infer with respect to salary amounts because there are so many
other factors at play and the VorstAG does not deal openly with
the question of salary in terms of a cap. But the VorstAG does
require that compensation be appropriate with respect to the
peer group and imposes liability on the Aufsichtsrat if compensation is higher than appropriate relative to peer companies
without sufficient justification. So while it is unclear whether
we are seeing the effects of slightly more cautious Aufsichtsrats, the correlation should be noted.
Evaluating whether the champions of the VorstAG were right
proves to be more difficult. For example, one of the key aspects
of the VorstAG that advocates found so alluring was that it
gave the Aufsichtsrat more control over a rogue Vorstand. Given that we are in the first few years of the VorstAG’s application, combined with a political and economic climate that has
produced the Occupy Wall Street movement fuelled by anger at
bankers and other high-earning individuals, it would seem unlikely that members of the Vorstand would be inclined to make
outrageous compensation demands during this time. Short of
misbehavior by the Vorstand, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of Aufsichtsrat control over the Vorstand. But one can see
some signs of the Aufsichtsrats preemptively flexing their muscles: though the VorstAG only applies to employment contracts
entered into after its effective date, members of a significant
number of Vorstands have agreed to change their existing employment agreements to comply with the new VorstAG requirements, even though they are not required to do so until
the end of their contracts.254 Vorstands where some or all
members have agreed to this change constitute a majority of
the DAX 30, though barely, and include BASF, BMW, Munich

254. I note here that this will mainly affect base salary—usually awards
from option compensation plans and the amount of bonus awarded is sufficiently discretionary as laid out in the employment agreement that its payment would reflect the VorstAG.
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RE, and ThyssenKrupps. In addition, more companies are offering a preview of “coming attractions” of sorts in their compensation disclosure, indicating where the company might tend
toward in the future. This is perhaps a sign that the Aufsichtsrat is taking more control of compensation strategy and development or at least eager to show shareholders that they are
taking the matter seriously, possibly even looking to test market reactions to their tentative plans. The most significant, but
not the only, examples of this were the previews and subsequent changes in light of the VorstAG itself. Linde, BASF, and
Deutsche Börse were among the nineteen companies that
started to discuss their VorstAG changes before fully implementing them, or gave a glimpse into what they would be discussing the following year. This trend continues, and is an interesting one. The idea that the Aufsichtsrat can be proactive
with respect to compensation policy rather than simply reactionary is very much within the spirit of the VorstAG. Another
benefit championed by the supporters of the VorstAG was that
defining a peer group could avoid a situation where outsized
and disproportionate payments are made, as was the perception with the Mannesmann affair. Again, only time will tell,
but in their disclosures more companies are emphasizing their
horizontal and vertical comparison process per the VorstAG, as
mentioned in Part III above. Interestingly, no companies chose
to publish which other companies they used to establish their
horizontal peer group in their CD&A section, as is done in the
United States.255
Proponents of the law were also excited about the inclusion of
the say-on-pay, which has been shown to decrease instances of
pay for failure in England.256 Whether it will have the same
effect in Germany remains to be seen. However, despite its optional nature, it is indeed being used by companies as a corporate governance tool and seems to be fully integrated into cor255. Cisco’s 2009 annual proxy, for example, includes a list of their initial
peer group, their then-current peer group, and an explanation of why there
was a change in these peer groups over time. See CISCO, 2009 PROXY
STATEMENT
50–52
(2009),
available
at
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/17275R/20090914/NPS_46091/HT
ML2/default.htm.
256. See German Companies Engage on Pay Ahead of First Say-on-Pay
(Jan.
15,
2010,
5:02
PM),
Votes,
MANIFEST
http://blog.manifest.co.uk/2010/01/2802.html.
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porate governance best practice standards,257 with most DAX
30 companies giving their shareholders an advisory say-on-pay
vote in 2010.258 Several companies also reported this shareholder approval in their 2010 annual reports, including K+S,
RWE, ThyssenKrupp, and Volkswagen, by either noting the
precise shareholder vote margin or indicating that the plans
were approved by “a large majority,” or similar wording.259 It
seems, too, that apprehension about the result of the vote has
not necessarily prevented companies from allowing the vote to
happen. In January 2010, both Siemens and ThyssenKrupp
met with shareholders ahead of time to address pay concerns
out of worry about the results of the vote.260
C. A New Era?
The final evaluative question is whether the VorstAG has
changed the game. Has it ushered in a new standard? Do people think about compensation differently? Based upon the annual reports, the answer would be “yes,” albeit in a limited
fashion. Executive compensation and disclosure appears to involve a new strategy following the VorstAG, as evidenced by
the new market standard in disclosure discussed above. Executive compensation strategies have been rethought and compensation packages rearranged. Companies also seem to be embracing the opportunity to positively affect their corporate governance image. Siemens, for example, used the say-on-pay to
help rebuild its image after its telecom bribery scandal that
was settled in 2008,261 and HeidelbergCement went from nonexistent disclosure to one of the best in the DAX 30. In any
case, it is clear that the German government no longer views
257. Friedl et al., supra note 200.
258. See Cleaning the Augean tables, THE ECONOMIST (June 23, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18867298.
259. K+S, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3233 (2011); RWE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT
143 (2011). ThyssenKrupp and Volkswagen even state the approving percentage, which is above 99% in both cases. THYSSENKRUPP, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 67 (2011); VOLKSWAGEN, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 133 (2011).
260. See German Companies Engage on Pay Ahead of First Say-on-Pay
Votes, supra note 256; Daniel Schäfer & Richard Milne, Siemens Awaits Investor Vote on Executive Pay, FIN. TIMES UK (Jan. 26, 2010, 2:00 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/90b9530e-0a19-11df-8b2300144feabdc0.html#axzz1eLVepcNi.
261. See David Gow, Record US Fine Ends Siemens Bribery Scandal,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2008, at 24.
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executive compensation as a top priority—the corporate governance issue du jour beginning in the fall of 2010 was the
matter of female representation on the Aufsichtsrat. In short,
there is a new platform for executive compensation reform.
How far the reform eventually reaches is something only
time—or perhaps the next compensation scandal—will tell.
V. APPLICABILITY
A. Lessons for Germany
It is important not only to assess the VorstAG on its own
terms as a success or failure, but also to see what can be
learned from the early VorstAG experience and implementation with respect to Germany’s future corporate governance efforts. The modest success of the VorstAG to date would seem to
endorse the German recommendation-plus approach to corporate governance: voluntary compliance with the Code provides
a barometer, allowing the government to see which measures
companies will comply with on their own while highlighting
areas where government intervention may be needed. This
trend, previously discussed in the context of the VorstOG
above, continued with the VorstAG to some degree, for example
with the requirement that responsible executives bear some of
the cost themselves in the event that the company’s D&O liability insurance is triggered. Female representation on the
Aufsichtsrat would seem to be the next portion of the Code that
is set to be transformed into law due to poor levels of compliance.262 The cries of impending doom at the thought of compensation reform, evidenced for example in a letter from the coalition of businessmen to Angela Merkel before enactment of the
VorstAG have proven to be merely bluster;263 the German
economy, up until the middle of 2012, weathered the financial
crisis and Great Recession rather well as compared with other
EU nations or the United States.264 In addition, Germany
262. Peter Wollmert et al., Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex—eine
Bilanz, CFOWORLD.COM (July 28, 2011), http://www.cfoworld.de/deutschercorporate-governance-kodex-eine-bilanz?page=3.
263. See Manager Protestieren bei Merkel, supra note 23.
264. Even in the throes of the European Debt Crisis in Fall 2011, German
unemployment fell and the country generated “surprisingly good retail data.”
AFP, German Jobs, Retail Sales Offer Rare Eurozone Cheer, THE LOCAL (Nov.
30, 2011), http://www.thelocal.de/money/20111130-39207.html. It has only
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proved that speedily enacted regulation is not necessarily
toothless.
One might argue that Germany could, and indeed should, be
more aggressive—that the regulations in the VorstAG do not go
far enough, and that Germany missed an opportunity to go
even further. But given the nature of the development of German regulations to this point, such calls are unrealistic. Germany has emphasized flexibility and transparency from the
beginning with the development of the Code. Because of the
various cultural and structural factors at play as discussed in
Part II, this approach has been unproblematic and, in fact, effective. Germany’s approach is a hands-on hands-off one, which
is to say that corporate governance is laissez faire until it is
not. Perhaps the German corporate governance approach ultimately works precisely because companies recognize that they
in essence exist on the brink. They will always be given some
flexibility to set their own corporate governance measures, but
how much flexibility they will be given and for how long is, in
reality, always an open question. Rather than wait and find
out, the lesson from the VorstAG is that companies themselves
can be proactive, with a result that both they and the government can learn to love.
B. Lessons for the United States
The lessons for the United States from the implementation of
the VorstAG are broader than those for Germany. This is in
large part because the German compensation reform system
seems to be working, though perhaps not as radically as some
critics might like. There was a perceived problem, a regulation
was enacted within a year, and within a short period of time it
seems to have achieved moderate success. The United States,
on the other hand, took over a year longer than Germany to
pass an act containing executive compensation reforms and six
months to begin the rulemaking process, which is far from
complete. It would seem that a few lessons learned from Germany’s experience might help change the parameters of the
debate and ease the gridlock in the United States, opening up
room to discuss some new approaches to this problem in the

been as the debt crisis in Europe stretches into its second year that some
cracks are beginning to show.
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country where, by most accounts, the problem is at its worst.
Four points in particular are worth mentioning.
1. Quick, Effective Reform is Possible
One of the most remarkable things about the VorstAG was
the speed with which it went from political topic to written law.
As previously discussed, Chancellor Merkel mentioned the topic in passing on a handful of occasions in the year before the
bill became law, and the time between its initial proposal in
March and passage by the Bundestag in June was a mere four
months. During those four months, the ruling coalition took
comments on the law from a variety of sources, including academics and political parties, and also made major reforms to
the initial proposal.265 By contrast, the initial proposal that became Dodd-Frank was announced by Obama in June 2009, took
more than a year for the bill to become law, and was still far
from being implemented in its entirety more than a year later.
The VorstAG was in effect by the beginning of August 2009 and
had already started to impact compensation structure and disclosure in 2009, as evidenced by press releases from Daimler on
December 16, 2009, and BASF on November 10, 2009,266 as
well as annual reports that had already started to preview upcoming changes.267 As discussed in Parts III and IV, the law
proved to be relatively effective, changing compensation disclosure and largely meeting the goals it had set for itself. This is a
major achievement, one which none of the U.S. compensation
laws have, until now, equaled. U.S. executive compensation
measures have, at worst, led to unintended and unfortunate
consequences and tend to fall short of expectations. One could
argue this is because executive compensation regulations are
more advanced in the United States than in Germany—
Germany is only just now taking care of the basics of its corporate governance, while the United States is already at a stage
of handling more complicated things. But this argument is
complicated by the fact that the latest legislation in the United
265. VorstAG Bearbeitungsstand 11.05.2009, on file with author.
266. Press Release, BASF, BASF Implements Law on Executive Compensation (Nov. 10, 2009); Press Release, Daimler, Daimler: Supervisory Board
Confirms System of Board of Management Remuneration (Dec. 16, 2009).
267. For examples, see ALLIANZ, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2010); HEIDELBERG
CEMENT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 222, at 43–44; INFINEON, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2010).
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States and Germany has an important feature in common, the
say-on-pay.
2. Control at the Board Level is Key
Many of the rules in the VorstAG focused on ensuring that
the Aufsichtsrat took its supervision powers seriously and on
preventing or discouraging undue influence on it or potential
collusion with it by the Vorstand. The VorstAG, contributing to
the increased professionalization of the Aufsichtsrat, made the
Aufsichtsrat more responsible by holding its members personally liable for excessive compensation. It gave the Aufsichtstrats
increased guidelines to go by as to what was appropriate and
what was inappropriate compensation and also provided them
with the power to drastically reduce compensation in the event
that the company suffered a severe economic setback. As a result, an Aufsichtsrat has to be more actively involved—the
rules provide many oversight responsibilities without setting
forth a one-size-fits-all regulation that allows the Aufsichtsrat
to simply check boxes. The Aufsichtsrat is left to determine
what exactly is appropriate and when, if ever, it should use its
extraordinary power to claw payments back. The two-year
break imposed on any member of the Vorstand who wishes to
become a member of the Aufsichtsrat absent shareholder approval further reinforces the distance that should exist between
the two organs on a theoretical level, while preserving or even
heightening actual shareholder control via the vote. It is also
worth noting that no DAX 30 company has dared to request
such shareholder approval in the wake of the VorstAG. Again,
this approach seems to have worked, yielding, if nothing else, a
more active Aufsichtsrat that pays attention to compensation
structure and disclosure and evaluates them in light of the
VorstAG.268
Naturally, Germany has a different corporate structure in
place than does the United States. The U.S. one-board system
means that, of necessity, inside and outside directors must be
part of the same organ and approve the same items. This is not
to say that some boundaries cannot be drawn between these
two groups, as Dodd-Frank has begun trying to do. A professionalization of the Compensation Committee, for example,
might be in order, similar to the changes in the requirements
268. See supra Part IV.B.
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for Audit Committees following Enron. For example, anyone
who reads the Disney case is struck by the fact that Sidney Poitier was a member of the compensation committee that approved those payments that shareholders took issue with.269
Despite his talents as an actor, Mr. Poitier’s expertise on appropriate levels of compensation for someone who is not even in
his line of work seems insufficient on its face. There could also
be additional measures imposed on all outside directors, such
as liability for excessive compensation. This concept of liability
for directors in some capacity is not new. Under SOX, CEOs
and CFOs face personal liability for incorrect annual statements.270
3. Salary Caps are Not Necessary
When people think of compensation reform, they often firmly
believe a cap is necessary. After all, one of the best ways to
curb spiraling salaries, a main complaint about executive compensation, would seem to be to limit them. In reality, however,
such caps prove difficult to structure and can have serious unintended consequences. Section 162(m) of the Tax Code, as discussed in Part I above, provides a vivid example: the cap becomes the new, government-sanctioned normal.271 Nevertheless, advocates of salary caps press on. It is worth noting that
in both Germany and the United States, there were effective
caps on executive salaries at the banks and insurance companies that tapped into government bailout funds.272 But these
limits, at least in the United States, were highly unpopular
269. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 39–40
(Del. 2006).
270. See Allen Bernard, Sarbanes-Oxley Could Send You to Jail, CIO
UPDATE
(June
16,
2005),
http://www.cioupdate.com/insights/article.php/3513481/Sarbanes-OxleyCould-Send-You-to-Jail.htm.
271. See Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Pay Continues to Rise Despite
“Pay
Reforms,”
N.Y.
L.J.
(Mar.
29,
2007),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=900005477320.
272. See Brill supra note 11; George Frey & Patrick Mcgroarty, Germany
Approves Bailout Terms, Sets Salary Cap, USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-20259607219_x.htm.
In the United States, the limits were approached with more nuance, managed
by the pay czar, Kenneth Feinberg, but they were nevertheless there. See
Brill supra note 11.
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with the companies themselves, and many banks rushed to repay their support if only to be allowed more freedom with their
funds.273 Caps also have their restrictions. Given the general
freedom of contract in the United States, the federal government can only impose caps when it has a jurisdictional basis,
which for the most part tends to be when a company is public
and therefore subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act.274 Some have therefore argued that a cap would simply
push highly paid executives out of the public system and into
the private, thereby transferring the problem to an industry
that is not regulated from a compensation perspective, at least
so far as the federal government is concerned.
One of the VorstAG’s most important, and indeed most promising, lessons is that regulation can be effective without a cap.
As discussed above, only a minority of the DAX 30 Vorstands
saw their compensation rise in the wake of the VorstAG. By
restructuring salary, imposing vesting periods, and imposing
more strictly monitored performance-based goals, one can truly
tie pay with performance. Whether the restructurings described in the annual reports will lead to long-term dividends
has yet to be seen. The short-term message is clear, though:
caps do not have to be a part of effective reform.
4. A Comprehensive Approach Yields Unexpected Dividends
Above all else, the VorstAG is animated by a philosophy of
imposing sustainability on executive compensation practices,
and this may indeed be its greatest contribution. The notion of
sustainability was not born overnight. It has long been an animating principle of the Code and corporate governance in Germany. Despite the lack of rulemaking processes that exist in

273. See Brill, supra note 11.
274. See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure
Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, BROOK. J. INT’L L.
485, 489 (2000). This is evidenced by the number of governance regulations
enacted under the SEC and their variety, particularly in comparison with a
place like Germany. The rules the SEC promulgated on July 10, 2009, with
respect to compensation and disclosure, provide examples. See SEC Releases
Proposed Rules on Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Proxy
Solicitation, CORP. & SEC. L. ALERT (Bass, Berry & Sims, PLC, New York,
N.Y.),
July
15,
2009,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.bassberry.com/communicationscenter/newsletters/ (follow July 15,
2009 hyperlink).
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Germany, companies essentially have a fallback interpretation
position, because the German government has made clear the
kind of regulatory direction it expects companies to take via the
approach they have taken to corporate governance implementation. The Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat are expected to run the
company for all of the shareholders, employing a responsible
and indeed sustainable management style. The VorstAG made
it clear that compensation packages are an important part of
this approach by focusing on sustainability and payment appropriateness as key criteria. By laying out general requirements without defining them down to the letter, the German
government simply provided guideposts on the spirit and
transparency which was to animate companies’ compensation
structures. How companies should put in place appropriate
structures and how companies could best show they were indeed attempting to make their compensation sustainable and
appropriate under the VorstAG was up to the companies themselves. Nearly all of the most interesting changes and developments came as a result of these guiding themes as companies
tried to figure out what the VorstAG meant. Hence, some companies included model calculations, others opted to expand
their substantive descriptions, some revamped their compensation structures, and others undertook serious evaluations of
their compensation and wound up staying essentially where
they were when they began. Regardless, it is the thought process involved in and the disclosure necessitated by compliance
that is important. From the evidence, it would seem that the
German government did not foresee just how much the
VorstAG would change company disclosure of compensation—
the government simply asked companies for greater transparency, and significant substantive change was the ancillary result of companies grappling to conform with the spirit of the
law.
In the United States, an open-ended law like the VorstAG
would be unlikely. Our administrative law procedures are different and arguably more cumbersome, resulting in volumes of
regulations that define in precise detail the applicable requirements.275 Had the VorstAG as such been passed in the
United States, the SEC would likely have defined “appropriate”
275. The books of U.S. tax code regulations, longer than the code itself, vividly illustrate this phenomenon.
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and “sustainable” in a far more rigorous way than they were
under the VorstAG. On the one hand, such definitions would
insure uniformity and a minimum understanding of compliance
from all parties.276 On the other hand, precisely defining every
word removes space for innovation and the opportunity to let
companies (and ultimately the market) decide what works well.
This kind of open-ended reform is critical for triggering the
self-reflection needed to determine how to best translate these
general principles into practical measures. This kind of selfreflection, in turn, is in and of itself vital. For if, as companies
say, the one-size-fits-all solution is too constraining, then they
are in the best situation to determine which solutions work
best for them. Why not, then, put them in the driver’s seat as
they request? The destination could be mandatory and clearly
defined, but each company’s path slightly less prescribed.
C. Lessons for an International Framework
Despite the talk of international executive regulations at G20
summits, with executive compensation being a thorny issue
that defies intra-national agreement, cobbling together regulation that the international community as a whole can support
can at times seem like a pipe dream. If one country with, at the
very least, a legal system and culture in common cannot agree
on executive compensation reform, how are countries like those
in the G20, with their differing legal systems, structures, and
cultures, supposed to arrive at any sort of a consensus? How
would one even begin such a discussion?
Again, the German experience with the VorstAG is helpful to
rebut the skeptics because it shows that a simple and relatively
open-ended rule can go quite a long way. The VorstAG’s focus
on sustainability and appropriateness, as discussed above, is
one of its most important contributions, and also the one that
could be most easily and successfully applied across international boundaries. With sustainability already a buzzword in
other contexts, it is a concept recognized the world over. Furthermore, it is not particularly revolutionary—few if any corporate founders, no matter their nationality or cultural background, start companies expecting them to end like Enron. On
the contrary, their company’s goal is to grow, thrive, and be276. However, only a minority of the DAX 30 left their disclosure largely
unchanged in response to the VorstAG.
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come established. Executive compensation is an expense like
any other, and any good businessman knows that expenses
must be worth their cost. Making executive compensation “sustainable” captures precisely that balance: compensation should
not bankrupt the company, but rather should be an incentive to
grow the company in productive ways. “Sustainable” is also
open-ended enough that it would allow for cultural flexibility
and sensitivity. Adopting a resolution at a G20 annual meeting
to urge public companies to implement sustainable compensation practices worldwide would therefore seem feasible.
Some could argue that an emphasis on sustainability would
sideline shareholder value and mean the death of the shareholder’s importance. But as mentioned in Part I, it is in shareholder-primacy cultures like the United States where, some
argue, the most change is needed. In the United States, change
is already underway, for while the shareholder remains the
most important concern in the corporate model, the assumptions about the shareholder in question are changing. No longer are we prioritizing the man who is in for a quick dime, or the
woman who is only interested in profits at the end of the quarter. With the proliferation of 401(k) plans, in addition to pension fund holdings, the United States has become a nation of
stockholders, dependent for their long-term wealth on the stock
market. Most shareholders are not in the game for the quarterly results qua quarterly results, but rather the overall performance of their funds over time. This fact has been unofficially
recognized in legislation—Dodd-Frank, among other legislative
efforts, tries to force companies to take a long-term perspective.
In the United States, shareholders, as the principals in the
principal-agent relationship, will always remain central. What
is changing in practice, though it remains unrecognized, is this
shift in the identity of the shareholder and the time horizons of
his investment.
CONCLUSION
Executive compensation and its reform has long been a thorn
in the sides of politicians. It seems to be the eternal problem to
which there is no solution: the fox is in the henhouse, and it is
the government’s job, from the outside, to try to at least forestall disaster and, at best, manage this tricky relationship. The
Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States has been
only the latest demonstration of dissatisfaction with compensa-
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tion structures, protesting against the richest 1% of Americans
who benefit from them.277 It is interesting here to note that
though the Occupy movement is global, its aims are not the
same all across the world. Occupy Berlin, for example, has
broader targets, protesting capitalism in general, but not compensation in particular.278 There are certainly many reasons for
this difference, but to understand them, we might do well to
look not only to the compensation laws and structures in place,
but also to the government responses.
Here is where the chief difference lies. The German government was highly responsive to an issue that was particularly
important to voters in light of the Great Recession. Faced with
public anger, it acted quickly to try to address the broader
qualms about opaque and poorly structured executive compensation. Critics will argue that the VorstAG did not definitively
solve the problem, and though they are not wrong, they are
missing the point. The important thing is that the German
government actually tried to do something about the problem,
unlike every other leading economic power at the time. Their
reforms, though modest, have had some very tangible results,
and the issue has now faded from importance in Germany—it
rarely appears in newspapers, and Germany is tackling other
corporate governance problems.
The United States has been characterized throughout its history as the land of opportunity, the place where change and innovation drive businesses and, indeed, the national mindset.
Part of the United States’ success in the twentieth century derived from using this innovation to its advantage, from the assembly line to the New Deal to the Berlin Airlift to Silicon Valley. But in matters of executive compensation reform, and political reform generally, the United States these days seems
less capable of the quick, decisive, and innovative action that
gave birth to the VorstAG. To break the stalemate, the United
States might do well to look across the Atlantic to the EU’s
most reluctant superpower, and just try something, even if it
277. Albert R. Hunt, Occupy Protests Seen from Left and Right, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/us/24iht-letter24.html.
278. In Germany, the focus was simply directly on banks. Teresa Dapp &
Stefan Engelbrecht, “Occupy Berlin”: 8000 Bankenkritiker umzingeln das
(Nov.
13,
2011),
Regierungsviertel,
DIE
WELT
http://www.welt.de/regionales/berlin/article13715208/8000-Bankenkritikerumzingeln-das-Regierungsviertel.html.
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seems unambitious. The results might amount to more than
expected.

